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Afghan constitutions have had a tendency to marginalize Afghan society.  As a 
result, the continued ethnic fragmentation of Afghanistan has minimized the capacity of 
constitutions of the past to achieve societal stability.  Instead, past Afghan constitutions 
have explicitly supported regimes rather than address the problems of the fragmentation 
of Afghanistan into small ethnic, linguistic, familial, and in some cases religious 
elements.  While Afghanistan’s current constitution accommodates the multi-ethnic 
pattern of Afghan society, it provides only a partial solution to the challenges of state 
building created by multi-ethnic societies.  The central purpose of this thesis, therefore, is 
to determine the sustainability of Afghanistan’s current constitution by analyzing the 
legacy and impact of past constitutions on the current document and its relationship with 
Afghan society and polity.  Each of Afghanistan’s constitutions of the past is missing 
important elements that prevented its impact on even the nearest reach of the rural tribal 
society.  The realities of the 2003 Constitutional Loyal Jirga, the manner in which it 
represented the population, and the language that it codified in Afghanistan’s 2004 
constitution will therefore have a lasting impact on Afghanistan’s future as well as reveal 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE  
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the sustainability of Afghanistan’s current 
constitution, signed 28 January 2004.  It will analyze the legacy and impact of past 
constitutions on the current constitution, examine the relationship of Afghan society and 
polity in relation to the constitution, and appraise the importance of a constitutionally-
based legal system for Afghan democratic development. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The overarching theme of the United States National Security Strategy is to 
promote democracy around the world, “Our own history is a long struggle to live up to 
our ideals.  But even in our worst moments, the principles enshrined in the Declaration of 
Independence were there to guide us.  As a result, America is not just a stronger, but is a 
freer more just society.”1 This statement suggests the importance of codified principals as 
critical foundations in nation-building.  Such principals are usually manifested in 
documents such as declarations of independence or constitutions and act as a sort of 
litmus test for the long-term success of democratic development.  A central proposition of 
this thesis is that Afghanistan’s transition to a stable democracy will be directly related to 
the principals of its recently ratified constitution.  This thesis also assumes that popular 
support and acceptance by the Afghan people for the constitution will be critical for 
Afghan democratic development.  A written constitution invariably provides answers to 
questions regarding the makeup of the government such as the election of national 
leaders, how they govern, and how the people interact with government.  In the absence 
of a constitution, it is reasonable to assume that such dynamics would take years to 
develop democratically. 
If a constitution is defined as “the highest law of the land” then the principles 
embodied within will help define the larger Afghan society.  For Afghanistan, the 
question is, does a larger Afghan society really exist?  Does a Tajik, Hazara, or a Pashtun 
think of himself or herself as an Afghan first and a member of an ethnic group second?  It 
                                                 
1 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington DC: The White House: 
September 2002), 3. 
2 
is the central objective of this thesis to determine whether the past constitutions 
accommodated the problem of sub-national identities.  Finally, by posing this question as 
preamble to assessing the viability of the current constitution, this thesis seeks to assess 
the impact of constitution making on the long-term stability of Afghanistan. 
C. PRIMARY THESIS ARGUMENT 
While Afghanistan’s current constitution accommodates the multi-ethnic pattern 
of Afghan society, it provides only a partial solution to the challenges of state building 
created by multi-ethnic societies.  The central purpose of this thesis is to determine the 
sustainability of Afghanistan’s current constitution by analyzing the legacy and impact of 
past constitutions on the current document and its relationship with Afghan society and 
polity.  This thesis will seek to determine the importance of a constitutionally-based legal 
system in the development of democracy in Afghanistan.  A primary finding of this thesis 
is that past Afghan constitutions have been formulated explicitly to support regimes 
rather than address the problems of the fragmentation of Afghanistan into small ethnic, 
linguistic, familial, and in some cases religious elements.  Hence, Afghan constitutions 
have had a tendency to marginalize Afghan society.  The continued ethnic fragmentation 
of Afghanistan has affected the role that these constitutions have played in impacting 
societal stability.  Each of Afghanistan’s constitutions from 1923 to the present is missing 
important elements that have prevented its impact on even the nearest reach of the rural 
tribal society. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapter II will address the comparative case study methodology pursued by this 
thesis.  First, an explanation will be offered as to why the comparative case study method 
was chosen and why the particular constitutions were selected for analysis.    Second, 
several propositions will be introduced to reveal the manner in which the primary 
constitutional analysis will be conducted.  Chapter III will develop the thesis argument 
by providing a comprehensive review of relevant literature.  Chapter IV begins the 
analysis of the constitutions by explicitly focusing on the propositions discussed in the 
methodology chapter.  Each section will begin by painting a brief historical picture and 
significance of the period leading up to the ratification of each constitution.  The 
propositions discussed in the methodology chapter will be subdivided in order to provide 
3 
a clear analysis leading up to the section’s concluding remarks including a description of 
the reality at the time of ratification.  The chapter will then conclude with an analysis of 
all three constitutions by comparing the results of the constitutional processes pursued 
relative to the key propositions.  Chapter V assesses the 2004 constitution.  This analysis 
will provide the context of the legacy and impact each had on the present constitution as 
well as speculate why the 2004 constitution draws so heavily from the 1964 constitution.  
A concluding section will illustrate implications of this analysis to Afghan state building.  
Finally, Chapter VI concludes with a comparative discussion of the results provided by 
the propositions discussed in all the constitutions.  This analysis will assess the problems 
Afghan constitution writing has faced, especially regarding sub-national ethnic traditions 
























































II. METHODOLOGY: A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF 
THREE AFGHAN CONSTITUTIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The central assumption of this thesis is that tribalism and ethnicity are critical 
factors in Afghan life.  Moreover, these societal and cultural factors and dynamics need 
to be reflected in instruments of governance such as the Afghan constitution.  It is further 
assumed that the inclusion, or at least recognition, of societal and cultural elements will 
greatly impact the longevity and ultimate success of the constitution.  In order to test 
these assumptions a comparative analysis of three of Afghanistan’s constitutions – 1923, 
1964, and 1977 – will be presented by this thesis and correlated with the 2004 
constitution.  The primary analytic question addressed by this thesis is how does the 
presence or absence of constitutional elements representing societal, tribal, and ethnic 
dynamics impact on an Afghan constitution’s longevity? 
The methodology of this thesis is designed to investigate how Afghanistan’s 
ethnic fragmentation has been either marginalized or ignored by the country’s 
constitutions, both past and present, and how this has impacted their ultimate utility. 
András Sajó suggests the importance of this strategy: 
To be able to live in a political society a minimum of collective identity is 
required, which cannot exist without homogeneity, a kind of community 
spirit or collective consciousness.  A minimum of homogeneity among 
people is necessary to avoid continuous strife and to tolerate one another.2 
The methodology of this thesis revolves around systematic case studies of Afghan 
constitutions and the constitutional processes.  The case studies are intended to answer an 
explicit question: why after 83 years of constitutional experimentation, has Afghanistan 
been unable to create a state apparatus that positively reflects and involves an ethnically 
divided society?  Looking across these cases will reveal each regime experienced similar 
trends in the desire to modernize and codify a constitution for Afghanistan’s future but at 
the expense of a large portion of Afghanistan’s ethnic society.  While Afghanistan has 
had at least seven written constitutions, the method in which the research question will be 
                                                 
2 András Sajó, Limiting Government: an Introduction to Constitutionalism, (Budapest, Hungary: 
Central European University Press, 1999), originally published as Az önkorlátozó hatalom (Budapest: 
Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, MTA Állam- és Jogtudományi Intézet, 1995), 24. 
6 
answered will be restricted to a comparison and contrast of three constitutions – 1923, 
1964, and 1977 – each with important historical contexts.  These comparative analyses 
will serve as a foundation for an analysis of the most recent constitution. 
B. CONSTITUTIONAL CASE STUDIES 
Each constitution is evaluated in relation to a number of propositions.  
Specifically the sustainability of each constitution will be correlated to the propositions as 
well as the constitution’s sustainability.  Each case will also determine how tribal 
fragmentation has affected the constitution’s capacity to influence societal stability. 
The particular constitutions selected for analysis each marked significant periods 
in Afghanistan’s political history.  The 1923 version was the first Afghan constitution and 
thus is an important document in solidifying Afghanistan’s position as a member of the 
international nation-state system.  Prior to 1919, Afghanistan was not recognized as a 
sovereign independent nation among the international community.  For almost 100 years 
prior, Afghanistan was a pawn and buffer state in the “Great Game” played out between 
the British and Russian Empires.3  The 1964 constitution is probably the most democratic 
of all Afghanistan’s constitutions and a model for the current constitution.  It adopted a 
bicameral legislature having a lower house (Wolesi Jirga) and upper house (Meshrango 
Jirga) to carry out legislative power.  This bicameral legislature was unlike earlier 
constitutionally based legislative authorities, which were merely extensions of the 
Afghan ruler.  The 1977 constitution abolished the monarchy in favor of a single-party 
presidential system.  Hence, this constitution represented a breakpoint in Afghan history.  
While an apparent reason for adopting this constitution was to rid the country of the 
excesses of the crown, it essentially shifted these excesses from the crown to the 
president. 
C. PROPOSITIONS 
Several propositions presented throughout this thesis will suggest if the 
codification process was fully representative, if the constitutions were considered 
supreme but changeable, if sovereignty was distributive, how power and accountability 
were distributed among the institutions of the state, if individual liberties were fully 
                                                 
3 Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia, (New York: Kodansha 
America, 1994), 123. 
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distributed, how narrowly defined was the role of Islam,4 and how much ethnicity played 
a role. 
Constitutions are “codes of rules which aspire to regulate the allocation of 
functions, powers and duties among the various agencies and offices of government, and 
define the relationships between these and the public.”5  Each Afghan constitution will be 
assessed via this definition and seven key features. 
The first feature examined is the constitution’s codification or ratification process.  
The ratification process pursued by each constitution is important because it is assumed 
that it will have important implications for the document’s legitimacy.  For example: 
• Did a truly representative portion of the population ratify the document?6 
The second key feature of a constitution to be analyzed is its legal status.  In other 
words: 
• Where does it fit into the hierarchy of laws? 
• Does it truly represent the highest law of the land? 
• Is it supreme over ordinary statutory or customary law? 
• Is it an amalgamation of tribal and religious law? 
• Does it have the ability to be amended and if so, what are the standards? 
The third key feature to be analyzed is the distribution of sovereignty afforded by 
the constitution: 
• How is sovereignty, via the constitution, distributed among the population? 
                                                 
4 This has valuable implications because it involves not an entirely homogeneous Islamic body but a 
body, nevertheless, which provides a common bond for the disparity that exists within an ethnically 
fragmented society.  The Ulama that Roy refers to encompasses for the most part the dominant Sunni 
Muslim population.  “So long as the state promulgates Shari’a, the Ulama is much more concerned with 
civil society than with the state.” Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 50. 
5 S.E. Finer, “Notes towards a History of Constitutions,” In Constitutions in Democratic Politics, 
edited by Vernon Bogdanor, (Aldershot, England: Gower Publishing, 1988), 17. 
6 Historically Loya Jirgas have played a critical role in the ratification process of Afghan constitutions.  
Past constitutions have been ratified by Loya Jirgas consisting of delegates theoretically representing all 
regions of the country. 
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• Conversely, does constitutional sovereignty lie in the hands of the few 
dominated by a certain ethnic group? 
The fourth key feature to be assessed is the constitutions’ establishment of 
institutions of the state.  Here the following questions will be addressed: 
• How do the constitutions operationalize notions and concepts such as 
separation of powers (both vertical and lateral) and how wide or accountable 
they are? 
• Are lateral powers separated via presidential or parliamentary systems or are 
vertical powers separated to include subnational levels of government? 
• Is all power tied up at the center or is the government organized around a 
federal state or is some subordinated power apportioned to separate units such 
as provinces or a confederal system that relies primarily on the consensus of 
peripheral units? 
• At the central level is there power of impeachment and to whom is it granted? 
• Is governmental power limited to a certain tribal unit (i.e. Sadozai Pashtun or 
Mohammadzai Pashtun or just Pashtun)? 
The fifth key feature is identifying the relationship between the state and 
individuals.  This is especially important in a tribally fragmented society such as 
Afghanistan.  Questions to be presented here include: 
• Do individual liberties allow for the ability to redress government? 
• Is maximum participation allowed in the political process such as participation 
at the intermediary, sub-national, or provincial levels of government. 
The final key features are the role of religion and ethnicity.  Questions to be 
entertained here include: 
• Does Islam play a role and is it narrowly defined such as limiting the role only 
to Sunni Islam or broad enough to permit inclusion of other major Islamic 
faiths such as the Shi’a? 
9 
• What is the degree of presence within the constitution of tribal-ethnic groups? 
All of the aforementioned factors and questions will be assessed for each Afghan 
constitution. These factors will then be qualitatively correlated with variables such as 
societal stability, government legitimacy and civil unrest.  These same factors will be 
examined relative to the 2004 constitution.  Doing this will provide the congruence with 































































III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There is considerable literature from fields such as history, cultural anthropology, 
political science, and constitutional law relevant to the questions raised in this thesis.  A 
primary objective of this literature review is the synthesis of relevant literature from each 
of these fields in order to provide a meaningful baseline concerning past theoretical and 
empirical work concerning constitutions and constitutional processes in ethnically 
divided societies. 
The organization of this literature review centers on a series of themes.  One such 
theme is the value placed on the way constitutions are written, the different types of 
constitutional models that exist in the world, and why constitutions have become so 
critical for a countries’ democratic development.  Particular attention focuses on past 
research concerning Afghanistan’s multi-ethnic tribal-centric society.7  This latter 
literature would seemingly be instructive in shedding light from a historical perspective 
on what the future holds for the present constitution, which is based on a presidential 
model.  For example, does the Jirga, as a symbolic tribal Afghan institution, have a place 
in a constitutional role and can it remedy the shortcomings of earlier constitutions and 
hence offer the perspective of stability to the current regime?  A third theme highlights 
current designs of constitutional models as it pertains to institution building in 
Afghanistan.  This includes a review of constitutional models including western-liberal, 
Islamic, tribal models or some combination of these.  One example is the importance 
attached to using the 1964 Afghan constitution as a model in drafting the current 
constitution.  For example, what structure did the 1964 constitution offer that other 
constitutions, such as the 1923 constitution, did not?  Afghanistan in 1923, for example, 
used a western and secular French model for its first constitutional project.  This section 
includes a brief discussion of Islamic constitutional models, as another example, while 
never attempted as an exclusive state-model for Afghanistan – with the exception of the 
                                                 
7 The term described in this thesis is defined using what Olivier Roy describes as a closely-knit group 
or the qawm.  This is a sociologically localized community; an endogenous community particularly referred 
here as a tribe, clan, or extended family.  Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 12. 
12 
Taliban regime – all of Afghanistan’s constitutions have recognized the Islamic tradition 
at varying intensities, thus suggesting the importance of codifying Islamic traditions. 
B. CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MODELS 
A staggering number of constitutions exist in the world – approximately 160.  
Over half of these constitutions have been formulated since 1974.8  This apparent desire 
to establish a written legal basis as a critical component of state building, particularly 
after a period of turmoil, has recently caused resurgence among scholars and legal experts 
to focus on the very idea of constitution writing.9  A more apparent reason for increased 
scholarly inquiry is that “recent constitutions are poor instruments of government and the 
failing of this needed to be addressed.”10  Before reviewing this literature, however, it is 
necessary to discuss a number of key definitions that are critical to the analyses that 
follow. 
S. E. Finer defines constitutions as, “codes of rules, which aspire to regulate the 
allocation of functions, powers, and duties among the various agencies and offices of 
government, and define the relationships between these and the public.”11  This definition 
is of particular interest because it demonstrates the fundamental differences between 
written constitutions and unwritten ones, which have been the subject of scholarly 
debates including those that believe constitutional rule of law does not exist if such a 
“code of rules” is not enshrined in a written document.12  In other words, constitutions 
are written codes that define the soul of a nation and fulfill a partial explanation for 
governments choosing to codify their institutions into a constitution.  S.E. Finer 
articulates the reason for written constitutions, “not just as general reminders, but as a 
                                                 
8 Robert A. Goldwin and Art Kaufman eds., Constitution Makers on Constitution Making: the 
Experience of Eight Nations, (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 
1988), vii. 
9 Irving Leonard Markovitz, “Constitutions, The Federalist Papers, and the Transition to Democracy,” 
Transitions to Democracy, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 42. 
10 Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives 
and Outcomes, (New York: New York University Press1997), 197. 
11 S.E. Finer, “Notes Towards a History of Constitutions,” in Constitutions in Democratic Politics, 
edited by Vernon Bogdanor, 17-32, (Aldershot, England: Gower Publishing, 1988), 17.  See also, S.E. 
Finer, Vernon Bogdanor, and Bernard Rudden, Comparing Constitutions, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), 1. 
12 Wil Waluchow, “Constitutionalism.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Spring 2004 
Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/constitutionalism/ (accessed June 14, 
2005). 
13 
simultaneous signaling device and self-acting sanction for its provisions.”13   András Sajó 
points out “A constitution is what it becomes during its life; but if we wish to define it, 
we must recognize that its creation is of utmost importance, and what happened before its 
adoption is at least as crucial as its later vicissitudes.”14  While abstract, Sajó’s critique 
clearly posits the need to understand written constitutions in the context of the populace, 
the frontispiece of the nation.  Therefore, a comprehensive synthesis of the previously 
mentioned terms provides the following perspective that guides this thesis.  A summary 
of written constitutions is one that provides a framework for the rules and limits of 
government power, and expresses sovereignty in a manner that distributes individual 
liberties equally. 
Constitutions need not be written in a single document.  Great Britain provides an 
immediately recognizable example of an unwritten constitution since there is no single 
written document that represents “The Constitution of Great Britain.”15  Rather a 
combination of written historical documents including legal precedents, common laws, 
charters, and agreements compose the “British Constitution.”  Documents such as the 
Magna Carta (1215), the Petition of Rights (1628), the Bill of Rights (1689), to present 
day common law, and their associated histories, all spanning a period of over 700 years, 
form the British constitution.  Unfortunately, most countries do not have the luxury of 
time that Great Britain did in creating an accepted body of law.  Emerging states today, 
such as Afghanistan, are often recovering and rebuilding institutions after years of civil 
strife and, therefore, often take place in an unstable post-conflict environment. 
How states approach constitution-making has been the subject of much academic 
discourse.  Recently, scholars studying post-conflict reconstruction and state building 
have focused on the process of constitution writing.  For example, Andrew Reynolds 
compares the process of writing constitutions to that of medical science.16  He argues 
that, “many constitutional designs have failed because the designers ignored the basics of 
                                                 
13 S.E. Finer, “Notes Towards a History of Constitutions,” 21. 
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good diagnosis and treatment, beginning with the Hippocratic injunction, ‘first, do no 
harm,’ providing a diagnosis, and offering six hypothetical propositions on which 
methodological work can proceed in constitutional design.”17  Herman Schwartz takes a 
more pragmatic approach in response to the uncertain futures many states face when 
emerging from conflict.  His view is that constitutions should enshrine some means of a 
formal review of the government structure.18  A formal review, for example, may exist as 
a council consisting of all the institutions of government as well as a group of delegates 
who are representative of the population.    The purpose of such a prescribed examination 
is so that peaceful bargaining can take place between all constituent parts of the nation 
when faced with realties that may require structural or institutional change.  Meanwhile, 
other scholars argue from a more theoretical point of view.  For example, Irving 
Markovitz recommends a review of the United States Constitution via The Federalist 
Papers.  His concern is that recent analysis in democratic transitions has focused too 
much effort on determining outcomes of authoritarian regimes.  While many interesting 
theories have emerged, he argues that not enough is known, “about the circumstances 
under which political actors have the power to break fee of supposedly deterministic 
forces to create their own society.”19  There are, however, plenty of examples that 
provide the “institutional settings” that were present at the time of transition.  For 
example, he used the Federalist Papers to explain the elements of the “institutional 
setting” of writing a constitution.  The Federalist Papers, he suggests, explains the 
constitution in terms of contracting a relationship between state and society.  Therefore, 
the constitution should be instituted as, “a mechanism for participation that promotes a 
long view, that traps the impatient, and builds hope for the future and not so much 
directing issues at eliminating abject poverty and extreme inequality, except very 
indirectly.”20  Overall, the process in which constitutions are written will provide insights 
as to the first proposition of this thesis.  That is, how consultative and representative they 
                                                 
17 Reynolds, 55-57. 
18 Herman Schwartz, “Building Blocks for a Constitution,” Issues of Democracy 9, no. 4 (Mar 2004), 
http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itdhr/0304/ijde/schwartz.htm (accessed 14 June 2005), 1. 
19 Irving Leonard Markovitz, “Constitutions, The Federalist Papers, and the Transition to Democracy,” 
Transitions to Democracy, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 3. 
20 Ibid., 11. 
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are, and how comprehensive and cautious they are in the review of documents and 
experiences of the past as well as examples and realities of the present. 
Relative to the definition described above, written constitutions enshrine rules 
meant to limit government powers; make laws or legislate, implement laws or execute, 
and arbitrate disputes under those laws or adjudicate.  It is therefore important to 
recognize that there are various ways, or models, in which to construct a framework for 
the rules, limits, and separation of government power.  These models are, according to 
Shugart and Carey, align primarily into two categories of presidential and parliamentary 
models.21  A purely parliamentary model, such as that created by the statutory 
codification of British government is a system in which there is one representative 
elected by the assembly that acts as an agent of the assembly rather than the electorate.  
This is in contrast with the presidential model where two separately elected agents, the 
assembly and the president, act directly on behalf of the electorate.  Shugart and Carrey 
pointed out that political practice among nearly all new democracies from the 1970’s 
through the 1990’s favored a presidential model even though the academic consensus of 
the “best” model was to the contrary.22  The authors set out to explain the apparent 
preference for presidential models among many newly democratizing regimes.  Results 
revealed an important emphasis on, “the inherent nature of checks and balances in 
presidentialism when majoritarian rule is opposed and the ability of voters to have the 
clearest possible choice as to the constitution of the executive.”23  Creating institutions of 
the state are not simply reserved for the national level.  As Sajó points out, the application 
of separation of powers can be along both lateral and vertical axes.24  Figure 1 illustrates 
one way in which this can be aligned. In this example, vertical separation is such that the 
government is centralized or unitary while all other sub-national levels of government are 
subordinate to the national level.  Lateral separation of powers is displayed at the national 
level indicating that separation of nation power is divided among three branches while 
the arrows between the separate branches represent checks and balances.  This is not to 
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say that a specific combination of lateral and vertical separation must exist as a perfect 
representation of a democratic institution but rather that, “without the separation of 
powers, that is, in the case of a homogenous power, it is much easier for the power to 

















Figure 1.   Vertical and lateral separation of powers. 
 
C. CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The meaning and symbolism attached to constitutions have a powerful spirit and 
can speak to the soul of a nation if that constitution enshrines and reflects the experiences 
of the society.  The soul of a nation, therefore, is composed of the collective past, present, 
and future experiences of the society and will determine the longevity of any document 
that is meant to exist as the supreme law of that nation.  This is the essence of 
constitutionalism and according to Sajó, “reaches back beyond Rousseau’s social contract 
theory in that the constitution is different than ordinary statutes by the fact that it has the 
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backing and agreement of a whole people, and is actually, or at least in theory, an 
acceptable arrangement for all the people constituting a society.”26 
According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy constitutionalism is, “the 
idea, often associated with the political theories of John Locke and the “founders” of the 
American republic, that government can and should be legally limited in its powers.”27  
Therefore, constitutionalism is not only tied to the will of the people but is also the basis 
for the legal limitation of government.  Charles Howard McIlwain a revered scholar on 
the Science of Government offers the antithesis to constitutionalism.  Constitutionalism is 
not “arbitrary rule…it is the opposite to despotic rule, the government of will instead of 
law.”28  It is therefore with good intention that states, who want to prevent despotic and 
arbitrary power in the future, adopt the idea of having a constitution.  Perhaps a more 
liberal-democratic definition of constitutionalism will help put this concept in better 
perspective.  Gerald Stourzh, an Austrian scholar of constitutional history, ascribes three 
main components to constitutionalism: equal and universal suffrage for full national 
representation, separation of powers, and the full protection of equality and individual 
rights under the law.29  András Sajó, on the other hand, breaks the idea of 
constitutionalism down to what he considers its basic component by pointing out that 
constitutions provide a framework for which to forge the relationship between state and 
society.  He argues a consequentialist theory in which “constitutionalism is concerned not 
solely with the organization of the state but more comprehensively with the organization 
of state-society relations.”30  Therefore, the constitution’s legitimacy is tied to its 
resulting consequences and not in its source.  Limiting government, incorporating the 
people, and preventing despotic rule are necessary but not sufficient components of 
successful constitutions.  Constitutionalism, therefore, is based on societal identities – 
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both national and sub-national – and the hope that a society will identify itself with the 
nation through a constitution.  This is the intrinsic nature of a constitution and if the 
constitution fails to identify the link between state and society, than any hope of 
designing a constitutional government will fail. 
Constitutionalism and Islam.  Constitutionalism in the Islamic world has 
developed in a different manner than its western liberal counterpart.  Afghanistan’s 
constitutions, in particular, embody an amalgamation of these different histories, events, 
and objectives (both internal and external).  It is, therefore, necessary to provide a 
separate interpretation of Islamic constitutionalism from that of the previously discussed 
Western Liberal Constitutionalism.  One way to assess the evolution and impact of 
Islamic constitutionalism is to review the works of several Islamic revivalist thinkers of 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Islamic philosophers such as Sayyid Jamal 
al-Din al-Afghani, Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, and Hasan al-Banna have provided 
widespread and popular discourse on the state of Islam and its relationship to people and 
institutions of power.  Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, a highly respected Islamic scholar, has 
provided a complete textual analysis of one these Islamic thinkers, Sayyid Abu’l-A’la 
Mawdudi.  Mawdudi is particularly important to understand because his visions of an 
Islamic state are compatible with many of the Muslim constitutions that exist today, 
which also express the heritage of western constitutional designs.  Mawdudi’s vision of 
an Islamic state was preoccupied with constitutionalism and included the state 
sanctioning of the religion.31  Primarily responding to the effects of modernity at the 
time, Mawdudi believed modernity was not a bad thing, as long as it was Islamic.  He 
was not troubled with accepting western notions of governing institutions more than he 
was with the secular notion of governance.  His essential principle was to take the fruits 
of modernity, even if this meant accepting a western framework of government, and 
placing an Islamic umbrella over that framework.  Mawdudi was intent on the idea that 
society should be firmly rooted in Islam; in other words, an Islamic identity would 
provide legitimacy for an Islamic state apparatus.  While Mawdudi’s conception of 
Islamic constitutionalism is only one representation of many Islamic political conceptions 
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of the state, it provides an important backdrop in understanding why most Muslim states 
choose to codify Islam in their constitutions.  To illustrate this point, Afghanistan’s past 
constitution writing experiences have not only produced constitutions that enshrined 
Islamic jurisprudence but combined this within a primarily western liberal constitutional 
framework.32  While Mawdudi explained a model of an Islamic state, Asta Olesen’s 
primary thesis concerning constitutionalism in Afghanistan, rested on the concept of 
legitimacy.  She asserted that state power, initially based on a tribal model of legitimacy, 
eventually gave way to the effects of modernizing reform projects.  After the first 
constitution was drafted, the legitimizing source of authority rested solely with Islam but 
this authority eventually eroded by the time the fourth constitution was ratified in 1977.  
She further asserted that at no time did Islam ever disappear in the language of the 
constitutions.33  To be sure, Islam appears in every constitution and plays various roles in 
defining the state and determining the rule of law.  Thus, the importance of Islam in the 
Afghan constitutions cannot be ignored and as a proposition of this thesis will be 
analyzed for the extent to which it is codified in the constitutions. 
Afghanistan’s case provides an interesting study in the constitution-writing 
experiment of a deeply religious and ethnically fragmented state.  Ethnic and religious 
identities, the forces of Afghan society, were present over 100 years ago and have not 
changed even after several constitutions have attempted to change them.  Therefore, 
analyzing the content of each of the constitutions studied in this thesis will provide 
insights as to whether Afghanistan’s current constitution has adapted to these persistent 
forces of society.  Before any analysis begins, however, it is necessary to provide a 
thorough description of Afghanistan extremely fragmented society.  The next section will 
attempt to shed light on this dynamic and why is plays such an integral role in Afghan 
politics. 
D. A TRIBAL-CENTRIC SOCIETY 
Afghanistan is an extremely ethnically diverse country.  In a report written for the 
Minority Rights Group, Nassim Jawad, focused on ten of Afghanistan’s largest minority 
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ethnic groups34 but acknowledged the existence of between 16 and 57 ethnic groups 
anytime throughout history.35  Moreover, this diversity has, in part, caused much of the 
internal strife that has dominated the country of the last hundreds of years.  Roughly 
correlated with Jawad’s analysis, Figure 1 illustrates the largest ethnic groups constituting 
the majority of Afghanistan’s population. 
 
Figure 2.   Ethno-linguistic Map of Afghanistan.36  
 
Olivier Roy has suggested that while tribal and religious customs and governing 
structures form the bedrock of Afghan stability, tribal code and personal faith are often in 
competing social and political spheres and at odds with one another.37  The tension 
between tribal code and personal faith also created difficulties resulting from the 
language present in Afghanistan’s constitutions.  For example, nearly all of Afghanistan’s 
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constitutions have either marginalized or ignored the issue of tribalism (tribal identities, 
customs, or codes).  In order to be viable, any Afghan constitution must incorporate 
rather than undermine or oppose these societal issues. 
While Afghanistan has had written constitutions for nearly 100 years, long-
standing unwritten rules or social rules, especially at the tribal level, have been 
operational for a millennium and many argue are just as precise and often more rigid than 
any written constitution.  In 2004, the International Legal Foundation conducted a wide-
ranging analysis of Afghanistan’s customary laws.  The finding of the study revealed that 
the customary laws, practiced by the tribes in the region around Afghanistan for over a 
thousand years, are actually very similar in that all revolve around the jirga, or council.  
A form of tribal code or customary law in Afghanistan predates even the influence of 
Islam, which made its way to Afghanistan by the ninth century.  It was through these 
tribal laws or unwritten codes that formed the bedrock of the traditional Afghan legal 
system.38  This customary law served as the foundation of primary community 
administration up to the first constitution and continues today. 
Several examples follow, which illustrate the similarity among these customary 
legal structures.  Pashtunwali, a familiar tribal code of the region, pertains to the largest 
ethnic group, the Pashtuns.  This tribal code, which revolves around the tribal assembly 
or council (jirga), has historically driven Pashtun interactions in an around southern 
Afghanistan.  In addition to the Pashtuns, tribal codes exist among most of the ethnic 
groups present in Afghanistan.  Similar tribal councils exist among the ethnic Hazara 
tribes that make up central Afghanistan.  These tribal councils are referred to as 
Maraka.39  In the far Eastern region of the Hindu Kush mountan range, there is the 
Nuristan province where there exist two levels of jirgas, the lower or Awra and the upper 
or Landhyar.40  In the north, which is remarkably more ethnically diverse than the more 
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homogeneous south where the Pashtuns dominate, there are at least three types of 
councils known as Shura-Eslahi, Jirgas, and Mooke-Jamaat-Khana.41  All of these tribal 
assemblies or councils perform similar tasks in that they act as sort of legislative, 
judiciary, or decision making bodies that will ultimately affect how tribal leaders conduct 
business both within and without tribe, especially during times of crisis. 
Tribal councils are also characterized by the approach in which justice is carried 
out.  Virtually all of the tribes of Afghanistan, for example, carry out a form of 
“restorative justice”42 that includes either an apology (nanawati) and a fine or just an 
apology.  The fines are usually in the form of blood money called poar in Pashto, jarima 
among the Hazara, nagha in the Nuristan region, and even in the ethnically diverse north, 
there is some system of fines as punishment among each tribe.  This is quite unlike the 
Western form of justice, which is based on retribution and involves some sort of jail or 
prison sentence.43  What is meant here is that any attempt to re-interpret or alter this 
traditional form of justice would require widespread change of traditional attitudes, 
beliefs, and behavior.  The aforementioned description of this Loya Jirga is as close to an 
uncodified or unwritten example of a constitution as Afghanistan’s history will permit. 
Afghan Ethnic and Social Fragmentation.  Societal Fragmentation in Afghanistan 
is pervasive and presents a significant set of problems for governance.  Afghan 
fragmentation is a historical legacy “since the structure of society in Afghanistan has not 
been undermined by colonialism.”44 Critical for Afghan development, was the social 
control and collective action centered on the khan.45  Khans are critical in Afghanistan, 
for the entire jirga system, especially during times of crisis.  Nevertheless, what does this 
similar form of community administration have to do with the fragmentation of society 
within Afghanistan?  As Olivier Roy explains in the first chapter of his book, Islam and 
Resistance in Afghanistan, this fragmentation emerges first into two large realms, the 
countryside and the state bureaucracy or the province and the town.  Each holds a mutual 
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contempt for the other.  The town is the realm of “change” or progress and the province is 
the realm of the “unchanged,” or tradition.  The glue that holds these two realms together 
is politics.46  Roy further breaks this down to realms that are between that of urban 
society and the society of the countryside and he argues that the constant interaction 
between these social groups has gradually worn away society in the countryside.  Since 
the town is the realm of “change” or progress, it is only natural to accept that change as 
part of a continuous resilient process.  In other words, it is much easier to integrate into 
the towns than it is to integrate into the provinces.  In the countryside the fragments are 
scattered, varied, and numerous, making integration or subjection much more difficult.  
Familial lineage, ethnicity, spoken language, tribal codes, and Islam are center to the way 
of life.  But it is often these same kinds of things that come in conflict with one another 
for various reasons.  Barnett Rubin goes further with this analysis by asserting that when 
the state began seeking external resources to maintain its independence it thus became 
weaker and to compensate for this, formed a large patronage network with the khans 
through ties of kinship.  This support kept the khans from forming larger tribal coalitions 
that could threaten the state’s legitimacy.47 Therefore, the “leaders encouraged further 
fragmentation of the society…thus defining ‘traditionalism’ and ‘localism’ as results of 
the countries forced integration into the contemporary state system.”48 
Afghanistan’s constitutional history has enshrined the jirga concept into a 
separate institution, but at the same time, enshrining the Pashtun familial lineage and 
spoken language has curtailed the traditional significance of the jirga, thus ignoring a 
significant ethnic portion of the population.  In addition to enshrining the Pashtun 
lineage, the state curtailed the effects of tribalism by giving more attention to Islam in the 
writing of the constitutions.49  As we shall see, the next section will explore literature that 
has focused on Afghanistan’s constitution writing projects of the last 100 years. 
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E. INSTITUTION BUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN PAST AND PRESENT 
State structures existed prior to the beginning of the great constitutional period in 
1923, but this legitimating process was wrapped around tribal traditions.  Asta Olesen 
provides one explanation for the nature of the Afghan state based on this transmission for 
legitimating power.  The argument highlights two models of state legitimation that have 
dominated the Afghan political landscape for centuries.  First, the tribal model was a 
means of legitimacy that predated even the first constitution.50  The tribal model provided 
the ultimate source of authority, Allah and the Prophet, a conduit mediated by the tribes 
via the institution of the jirga through which the Amir could rule.51  The Islamic model, 
on the other hand, provided the ultimate source of authority, Allah and the Prophet, and 
served as a conduit mediated by the ulama through which the Amir could rule.52  
Therefore, in order to understand the way in which Afghanistan has carried out institution 
building, it is important to understand the conflicting nature that Islam and tribalism have 
played in legitimizing central authority. 
The two models of state legitimation have not always provided the legitimating 
source of state authority.  Oleson points out that each constitutional experiment has either 
adapted or rejected these models as sources of legitimacy.  The language in the first 
constitution, for example, was influenced by Amanullah’s desire to “modernize” 
Afghanistan as well as his fascination with all things “Western.” Hence, the King’s 
travels to Europe, his own personality, as well as the influence of thinkers of the Islamic 
modernist movement greatly influenced the development of Afghan’s first constitution.  
Olesen argues that tribal influences were no longer at the forefront of legitimizing the 
state and describes the wave of pan-Islamism as an expression of Afghanistan’s 
constitutional ideals. 
Much of the pan-Islamic ideas that provided constitutional influence came from 
Mahmud Tarzi, a prominent Afghan member of the Islamic modernist movement.  Much 
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like Mawdudi and al-Afghani before him, Tarzi was not against emulating the way in 
which the west modernized but modernizing on purely Islamic terms was what was most 
important to him.53  The Young Afghans, an Afghan modernist movement, interestingly 
referred to as the Mashrutiya (constitutional group), and Tarzi through a close association 
to the King, influenced the drafting of the new constitution.  All of these influences 
caused the tribal model to lose much of its significance as a legitimizing influence.54  
While the Islamic model still held much sway,55 it was not until after the fifties, that the 
ulama became dissatisfied with the state’s shift in legitimizing their power with 
something other than Islam.  After the 1964 constitution, the models for legitimation 
changed dramatically and no longer focused on Islam or tribal legitimacy.  The ultimate 
source of authority was no longer Islam; it was instead the nation, mediated by the King, 
for which the Parliament could rule.56  By 1977 however, legitimation was further 
distorted.  The people, represented by the Loya Jirga became the ultimate source of 
authority, mediated by the president, through which the Melli Jirga or Party could rule.57  
Unfortunately, after 1992, the various mujāhidīn groups attempted to make the state more 
in-line with mores of Islam, but the groups differed greatly on how this could be 
accomplished.58  The lack of congruence across mujāhidīn groups lead to a brutal civil 
war and the near complete political collapse of the system. 
While the models discussed above offer explanations as to how various Afghan 
states legitimized their power, the models do not answer the primary reason for the 
failures of these constitutions.  Literature on Afghanistan’s history with constitution 
writing is sparse and much of the data required for such studies has been inhibited due to 
the destruction of valuable historical data after so many years of conflict in the country.  
One fact is clear however.  Past constitutions have indeed affected the current 
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constitution writing process in Afghanistan.  Nighat Mehroze Chishti in the most 
comprehensive comparative study regarding Afghanistan’s previous constitutions has 
offered the following primary thesis as to the failures of the constitutions of 1923, 1931, 
1964, and 1977. 
Though the Afghan rulers tried honestly to modernize the political system 
in Afghanistan and to give it a democratic touch, at the same time they did 
not share their powers with the people open-heartedly…the success of any 
constitution not only depends on the people who execute it, but it should 
be according to the nature and mood of the people to be ruled by it59 
Power sharing, representative-government, and individual liberties are all essential 
principles enshrined in democratic constitutions.  Chishti’s argument is that Afghan 
leaders have not lived up to their good intentions and enshrined such concepts in the 
constitutions they created.  The problem of centralization and lip service to traditional 
tribal and religious institutions have led to discontent between government and the 
populace and in turn resulted in Afghan societal instability. 
A wide array of literature regarding the 2004 constitution focuses primarily on 
theoretical models of constitutional design prior its ratification.  The literature regarding 
the final ratified version while limited offers a comprehensive review of the 
Constitutional Loya Jirga.  Afghanistan’s present constitution supports a highly 
centralized presidential system, as have constitutions of the past.  Some critics suggest 
that presidential centralization is poorly adapted to Afghan realities, which would better 
accommodate either a federal republic or a parliamentary system.60  Carol Riphenburg, 
offers a dissenting view: “Presidentialism offers a clear hierarchy, an obvious line of 
authority, thought crucial to maintaining order in Afghanistan’s fractured political 
environment.  Not providing for a prime minister precludes any rival for executive 
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authority.”61  However, a closer look at federalism may offer an alternative option for an 
ethnically fragmented society such as Afghanistan.  For example, Nancy Bermeo argues, 
“federalism provides more layers of government and thus more settings for peaceful 
bargaining”62 for states such as Afghanistan.  As far as the constitution providing long-
term stability, there are some scholars who believe that Afghanistan, “may be off to a 
good start with the adoption of the 2004 constitution, but it seems likely that a revision 
will be necessary in five to ten years.”63 Others seem pessimistic about the ideals of the 
constitution paired with the current realities that face Afghanistan and its people as a 
whole.64 
The 2004 constitution specifically addresses the importance of human rights – due 
primarily to the explicit language laid out in the Bonn Accords, the roadmap for 
Afghanistan’s future after the defeat of the Taliban regime by the Northern Alliance with 
the aid of an international coalition.65  While the constitution defines the role of the 
people as individuals and their relationship to the state, the issue of local governing 
customs is ignored, marginalized, and otherwise missing within the text.  This is 
problematic because local governing customs and structures play an active and vital role 
in Afghanistan’s civil society.  The “qawm”66 in many ways acts as an individual 
governing body in Afghan society where loyalties lie not with the central government but 
with the local family or village structure.  As a result, part of the analysis of this thesis is 
to determine if the present constitution fully integrates these units or structures within a 
national identity or if will be similar to failures of the past. 
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Given the variety of literature and theoretical concepts that have guided the 
research regarding this topic and in keeping with the propositions suggested by this 
thesis, the following assumption is put forth for the success of the 2004 constitution in 
light of past constitutional experiments.  The Constitution must exemplify a 
representative portion of the people who are given the opportunity to participate in the 
creation of the document that represents the supreme law of the land.  As a representation 
of the will of the people, they have the power to change it due to its imperfect nature, but 
not without checks and balances inherent in the institutions they created.  The 
formulation of this must be careful not to infringe on individual freedoms as well as the 
religious and tribal customs that forge an extremely important part of their existence. 
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
While the history of the Afghan “state” can be traced from the time of Ahmad 
Shah Durrani, the notion of an “Afghan” nation is still problematic.  It is a concept that 
has often been at odds with how an individual Afghan views himself within the hierarchy 
of identities with other social groups.67  The only political outlet that has historically 
connected society with the state is through the tribal confederation68 and this has only 
been used to the extent of carrying out the interests of the dominant tribal legacy.  The 
concept of a tribal confederation has since become enshrined in the temporal institutional 
powers stated in the constitutions.  This chapter will provide an analysis of the 
constitutions by providing a brief historical picture, followed by an in-depth discussion of 
the propositions discussed in earlier chapters, and conclude with a discussion of the 
comparative results of these propositions. 
B. 1923 CONSTITUTION 
The 1923 Constitution of Afghanistan was written during a period of significant 
cultural and political reform.  During this period, the concept of the Afghan “nation” was 
in great flux.  For example, the periphery or Afghan rural dwellers (the vast majority of 
the population) only identified with the country center in terms of a religious perspective, 
believing they were surrounded by infidels and unbelievers – a product of being a buffer 
state and pawn in the “Great Game” played out by the super powers of the European and 
Asian Continents.69  The drafting of the 1923 constitution was also a period when 
Afghanistan became a sovereign and independent country.  This independence while 
recognized by the world was not necessarily recognized by Afghans.70  Provincial 
Councils, a key component of independence, were only considered advisory bodies and 
the King directly appointed half of the membership in these councils.71  Many of these 
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appointments consisted of high-ranking civil servants who had already been co-opted by 
the government.72  Moreover, the rule of law was still very archaic with the official 
establishment of a state judiciary on a temporary basis only for the use of settling 
disputes within the government.73  Article 2 of the 1923 Constitution, for example, was 
amended to add the provision that “Hindus and Jews must pay the special tax and wear 
distinctive clothing” and actually reversed codified freedoms. 
The ascendancy of Amanullah Khan as the new Amir of Afghanistan began a 
journey of Afghanistan towards constitutionalism and nationalism.  This journey had 
close and profound linkages with the political evolution of the post-Ottoman period in 
Turkey.  Amanullah recognized the need to bring Afghanistan into the modern world by 
forcibly defining itself as a modern nation-state on Western terms.  He also believed that 
Afghanistan could identify with the politicizing process of its Muslim brethren to the 
West. 
The ratification of the 1923 Afghan constitution represented a significant and 
historic event.  Between the years 1919 and 1923 Amir Amanullah Khan, with the aid of 
French and Turkish advisors, achieved what his grandfather Amir Abdur Rahman Khan 
(1880-1901) had only hoped for during his entire 21 years of rule – the establishment of a 
constitutional government.74  Between 1922 and 1923, the council and government 
worked diligently to promulgate legislation that would embody the “Constitution of 
Afghanistan,” or Nizāmnāma-i Asasi-e Daulat-e `Aliyah-e Afghanistan.75 
Table 1, below, represents the outcome of the key propositions of this thesis.  
Negative annotation, beginning with the codification process, shows that Afghanistan’s 
initial constitution played virtually no role in creating a constitutional state.  It was a mere 
mechanism for codifying the government administrative apparatus and legitimizing the 
King’s right to rule.  The desire to secularize and remain faithful to Islam created a dual 
means for legitimation, causing a certain amount of dysfunction in codifying principles.  
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The Loya Jirga was not entirely representative and therefore meant little in terms of its 
use as a legitimating tool.  While a negative value is associated with the constitution’s 
failure in defining its supreme nature, a positive value is associated with the difficulty in 
which amendments were proposed and ratified by the King.  Additional negative 
annotations show that sovereignty was not fully distributive, the King failed to devolve 
the power of the monarchy and no accountability was established.  Negative annotation 
further demonstrates that the King had absolute power as the final arbiter for enactment 
of law and granting of individual privileges and virtually ignored the presence of the 
tribal fragmentation of the countryside.  Islam was firmly codified, but a double positive 
annotation shows that it was very narrowly defined and left out a large portion of the 
population.  The next section begins by discussing the process by which the constitution 
was codified. 

















Constitution -- - + - - - - + + - 
Table 1. 1923 Constitutional Factors. 
 
1. Codification 
In deciding to draft a constitution for Afghanistan, Amanullah sought the council 
of French and Turkish advisors.  His primary advice however came from a Young Turk76 
named Badri Bey and the Turkish constitutional model – a fledgling document itself – 
became Amanullah’s constitutional model.  A fledgling constitutional government is 
hardly something that an advisor would expect to be a good model to emulate.  In 
addition to seeking external advice Amanullah decided to form a Loya Jirga supposedly 
for the purpose of providing tribal legitimacy to the document.  However, this council 
was shrouded in mystery.  One scholar, through pure academic deduction believes a Loya 
Jirga, which took place in 1921, produced the 1923 Constitution.  The validity of this 
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deduction, however, is not easy to prove because of the difficulty encountered in 
translating the documentary evidence.77  Other scholars more interested in the document 
itself reached the same conclusion by merely assuming that the Loya Jirga or The 
Assembly of Elders took place.  On the contrary, the Loya Jirga that apparently gathered 
in Jalalabad, by edict of the Amir, to draft a constitution, alone revealed the importance 
of this body.  The Loya Jirga, presided over by the Amir, therefore demonstrated that the 
intention for holding the meeting itself was part of a systematic tradition in order to gain 
consensus among important Pashtun tribal leaders that would affect the whole of the 
realm.  In attendance at the Loya Jirga were Northeastern Pashtuns from the Nuristan 
region, particularly from the Ghilzai tribe, the king’s ethnic tribe, as well as people from 
the Jalalabad region and, themselves, primarily Pashtun in essence.78  One of the primary 
reasons for this was not only that this was close to the homeland of the Amir but that the 
areas North of Kabul had grown increasingly resistant to the reforming policies already 
undertaken in the years previous.79  It stands therefore that while Amanullah was 
following a long held tradition through gaining consensus in a Loya Jirga, in order to 
draft a legal document to bind the whole of Afghanistan, he did this primarily using 
elements of his own kin group.  As a result, the legitimacy of the document came under 
harsh scrutiny since it did not reflect a representative proportion of the ethnically and 
tribally diverse society. 
2. Legal Status 
Statutes were codified during Amanullah’s reign at a staggering pace and reveal 
the astounding number of complexities of enacting an entire legal code in a relatively 
short period.  The sixty-four legal codes listed in Poullada’s book are perhaps a small 
sample of all the laws enacted during Amanullah’s reign, totaling a reported four 
volumes.80  The actual existence of the constitution was also shrouded in mystery, after 
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having been found in a Kabul bookseller’s bazaar.81  In this sense, part of the confusion 
of the origin of the constitution becomes clear since it bore the same title, Nizāmnāma, as 
other legal codes did.  These legal codes were produced into a series of individual 
booklets, the drafts of which, aided by the French and Turkish jurists, became the “first 
comprehensive legal code in Afghanistan.”82  The real framework for the basic 
organization of government lay within these codes, particularly the statute for the Basic 
Organization of Government or Nizāmnāma-e Tashkilat-e Asasiya-e Afghanistan. 
The legal nature of the constitution is also unclear.  There is no article 
proclaiming the constitution to be the supreme law of the land and no establishment of a 
hierarchy of laws.  Instead, matters pertaining to laws and the courts as laid out in the 
Constitution refer to the Nizāmnāmas.  The peculiarity of this feature becomes more 
bewildering in Article 69, which prevents the cancellation or suspension of the 
constitution for whatever reason.  This means that the Nizāmnāma laws were the binding 
feature of the constitution and that they could not be canceled or suspended. 
Another feature of the legal nature of a constitution is its amenability.  By all 
standards, this test is an essential element of a constitution and most constitutional 
scholars argue that a constitution should be difficult to amend.83  While Article 70 of the 
1923 Constitution declares the amenability of the constitution and seems rigorous in 
nature, Article 41, however, reveals that the king had the power to appoint half of the 
state council.  This is the very council responsible for amendments.  In reality, 
amenability, therefore, rested in the hands of the King, rather than the people, represented 
by the state council. 
3. Distribution of Sovereignty 
According to the 1923 constitution, Afghan State sovereignty was not inherited by 
the nation; rather it was pledged, on behalf of the King to rule in their stead.84  In the 
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classic western notion of sovereignty, this was a contract, and it was perfectly legitimate 
but “according to John Locke, a contract between the King and the people, did not mean 
a complete resignation of rights.”  Article 4, however established a dual sovereignty in 
that the King was bound to, “rule in accordance with the principles enunciated in the 
Shari’a…and remain faithful to the nation.”  This language was primarily a combination 
of Amanullah’s exposure to western and secular constitutional models as well as ideas 
related to Islamic modernism, the Islamic state model, and his own personal faith in 
Islam.  Seeking authority in two bodies, however, created a conflict of interest.  In other 
words, how can sovereignty rest with both the people and with Allah?  The duality of 
sovereignty created by the language in Article 4 caused great criticism, especially among 
his chief supporters, Mahmud Tarzi.  Influenced also by the Young Turk movement and 
the secular political developments in Turkey, Amanullah wanted power to rule 
legitimately through the nation and he wanted this integrated into the constitution.  
Ultimately, the codification of secular and religious laws, without a clear line of 
authority, priority, or precedent essentially created a challenge between the Islamic 
qualities of “the believer and the umma and the concepts of citizen and society.”85 
4. Relationship Between the Institutions of the State 
Prior to 1919, the office of the King was the only institution of state power.  There 
were other administrative offices commissioned by the king in order to run the day-to-
day business of government.  Therefore, the relationship between any other institutions 
and the king was one of subordination.  This became a significant aspect in the new 
constitution because it marked a dramatic shift from the centralizing tendencies of the 
monarchy to the specific enumeration of powers that essentially divided power between 
the king, the council, and the judiciary. 
a. Separation of Powers 
Power sharing in the first Afghan constitution was limited to non-existent.  
The extent of any exercise of power outside the purview of the king was, “vested in the 
council of ministers and independent departments (idarah-ye-mustaqel)”86 and this was 
to serve a purely administrative function.  The council of ministers served this 
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administrative function by formulating foreign and domestic policy, which incidentally 
the king presided over as the council “chairman.”87  In other words, the King was the 
‘executor’ because there was no prime minister.  In addition to this, every year a high 
assembly (Darbār-e A`la) would gather and perform a review of the previous years 
achievements,88 but no genuine independence was achieved in the constitutional 
establishment of this institution.  In reality, it served a ceremonial function since it was 
held just before independence celebrations. 
In addition to the council of ministers, the constitution established state 
and provincial councils, of which the king directly appointed half the members.89  All of 
these councils merely acted as advisory bodies.  There was also some formulation of a 
judicial system but the constitution did not establish a permanent judicial body.  An 
interesting peculiarity is the exception made in Article 55, “No special court to hear and 
adjudicate a special case or issue may be established outside the framework of the regular 
judiciary.”  For example, the application of any tribal customary laws fell into this 
category of a “special court” and therefore outside the framework established in the 
constitution.  Perhaps by not allowing the tribal framework to operate within its own 
customary traditions, it was a convenient way for the central government to subdue the 
power of the tribal leaders, effectively reducing them to ‘wards’ of the state.  If a formal 
separation of power is one in which the legislature and the executive are separated by, 
“making ministers responsible to the legislature and effectively denying the Crown its 
veto powers,”90 than the observations made above show that a formal separation of 
powers never occurred in this sense. 
b. Lines of Accountability 
Checks and balances was a concept that was foreign to this Constitution.  
All ministers were responsible to the king and in the case of official misconduct, the 
constitution called for an immediate trial by a high court.  Such a court was especially 
established for the duration of the trial,91 as well as the immediate dismissal of the 
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minister from all duties.92  This, of course, did not apply in any case of misconduct on the 
monarch’s part.  A system of checks and balances was non-existent for such a 
circumstance.  While Article 53 established an independent judiciary free from 
interference and intervention, as a separate power institution the court system was too 
complicated to be effective.  To ease this burden, a separate law was drafted, Nizāmnāma 
of Basic government organization, in order to accommodate the three-tiered judicial 
system of shari’a courts that had already been in place at the time of the drafting of the 
constitution.  Although Article 53 established an independent court system, the king had 
the power of appointing all of the judges that sat on the higher state-courts in Kabul.93  
Executive appointment of the judiciary in the top-level court systems is a common 
practice in many western constitutional governments such as the United States, but the 
rotation every four to eight years of the executive prevents any concentration of power in 
the judiciary.  In Afghanistan’s case, the monarch held power for a lifetime, thus having 
the ability to tip the balance of power by appointing judges favorable to his influence.  In 
spite of the separation of institutions set in place by the constitution, the primacy of the 
power of the monarch prevented any true ‘separation of power’ and ‘checks and 
balances’ in the classical sense. 
The constitution offered no institutions or process for the impeachment of 
the King.  Moreover, the constitution virtually left the King’s power unchecked.  The 
government was limited only to the extent that the King would keep his promise to rule, 
“in accordance with the principles enunciated in the Shari’a and in the constitution.”94 
5. Individuals and the State 
In light of a century of political and ethnic turmoil prior to 1919 and the 
confluence of the Pashtun tribes, in particular, which formed the monarchical apparatus; 
the constitution, in theory, codified another first – individual liberties and personal 
freedom for all subjects of the kingdom regardless of their religious or sect affiliation.95  
In addition, the codification of other basic freedoms included the right to a free press, 
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compulsory education, equal opportunity, personal property, equality before the law, and 
the redress of grievances.96  Freedom of assembly and the establishment of political 
parties were not codified until later constitutions.  While Amanullah’s great national 
project was a genuine intent to safeguard citizenship and fundamental human rights, it 
was undermined by his failure to recognize the differences in ethnic tribal borders and 
fluidly incorporate all of these elements into the Constitution.  It was also contradicted by 
his desire to keep the ulama and the tribal leaders of his kin group at peace.97 
Another aspect to this analysis is the dynamic of the relationship between 
individuals and the state created by the formation of state and provincial councils as well 
as ministerial satellites placed in each province.  It was Amanullah’s purpose to provide a 
healthy development of provincial and local government in order to provide the linkage 
between the government and the people.98  The constitution provided that each province 
have direct representatives to the government to give citizens a channel by which to file 
formal grievances.99  Local communities traditionally kept to tribal standards by dealing 
with the khan who in turn brokered with the state representatives in the community.  This 
elaborate system of tribal relationships based on loyalty and kinship, however, was the 
subject matter of an anti-corruption campaign that all but destroyed the relationship 
between the tribes and King and thus made it most difficult and conflicting for the new 
citizens of the state.  The King’s final arbiter for the modernization and nationalization 
project, the constitution, became a duplicitous tool for reverting to its centralizing 
tendencies by co-opting the Pashtun tribes in order to entrench the central administration 
and maintain power. 
6. Religion and the State 
While Islam was codified in the constitution, it was also narrowly defined as a 
proclamation of the state religion and codified as the primary source for the rule of 
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law.100  Before the ratification of the constitution, the concept of the Divine Will was the 
primary source for legitimation of power and it was only through the support of the 
Ulamā that the king was able to legitimize his rule in this way.  This practice of 
legitimizing the power to rule via Islam diminished greatly after the 1923 constitution 
came into effect with the dual nature of sovereignty.  While the ulama were still a 
necessary component for the state to achieve legitimacy, an additional component was 
added as an authoritative source.  Instead of the King ruling by ‘divine right,’ he also 
received legitimation through the nation.101  “The only difference between the original 
text and the revised text, after the Khost rebellion is that it resulted in more explicit 
language on religion, especially with Article 2.  Freedom initially granted to other 
religions such as Hindus and Jews suddenly reduced to the requirement to “wear 
distinctive clothing and pay special taxes.”  Article 2 also amended the emphasis from 
declaring Islam the state religion to adding the provision that the official religious rite of 
the state was the Hanafi legal tradition.102  It was as difficult to fuse these diametrically 
separate concepts as it is now and thus has been one of the primary obstacles to fulfilling 
a genuinely democratic building process within the state. 
7. Ethnicity and the State 
At the writing of the 1923 Constitution, the organization of society was extremely 
tribal-centric, with family, village, and community units all centered on the khan (tribal 
leader) and in most cases related to the khan.  Prior to the Khost rebellion and the 
resulting amendments made to the constitution, there was no reference made to the 
existence of any tribal structures.103  This contributed to the various reasons for the 
outbreak of civil violence.  It is not so much the absence of tribal elements in the 
constitution that disregard the important role that tribal and ethnic structures play within 
Afghanistan but the presence of elements that directly counter this tribally fragmented 
society.  For example, Article 22 states that, “confiscation and forced labor is absolutely 
prohibited except that during time of war, labor services may be required in accordance 
with the provision of appropriate laws.”  While this statement appears to be ambiguous, if 
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the reference is made to the appropriate Nizāmnāma regarding service to the nation 
during time of war – the law concerning domestic military service – then it became clear 
the meaning of Article 22.  This Nizāmnāma enacted a lottery system of conscription,104  
which embroiled the tribes because the lottery, or hasht nafari system, conscripted every 
eighth man of a village or community.  The local khan was traditionally in control of 
recruiting village men during a time of crisis.  The Law essentially stripped this 
traditional power from the khans.  Another point of particular contention resulting from 
the language in the Constitution, involved the challenge it made to the traditional role of 
the men in the family.  Articles such as granting personal liberties, education for all, and 
equal rights,105 essentially gave many liberties to women.  Women in traditional Afghan 
tribal society are intimately linked with the concepts of nang (disgrace) and nāmus 
(reputation/chastity).  The Constitutional Articles allowing for free education to all and 
personal liberties implied Amanullah’s reforming policies for granting liberal education 
to women as well as the practice of unveiling.  The tribesman saw this action as a direct 
threat to their honor.106 
8. Constitutional Reality 
The 1923 constitution was essentially an extension of the Reform policy enacted 
by Amanullah at the beginning of his reign in 1919.  As with the emphasizing elements 
of the reform policy – legal, judicial, administrative, and economic – the basic framework 
of the constitution that codified these institutions was the extent of 1923 Constitutional 
experiment.  For Olesen the reform policy reflected, “a vision of an Islamic model of 
modernization and the admiration of the Young Turks’ practical and secular efforts to 
turn a Muslim empire into a modern nation-state.”107 The Constitution was created only 
in order to codify the state administrative apparatus.  No real effort was made to make the 
process representative, transfer sovereignty to the people, grant individual rights, or 
represent the various religious, ethnic, and tribal elements.  After the creation of 
institutions, it conceded to the ulamā in order to keep them at peace,108 which created 
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dynamics that led to an ambiguous political atmosphere.  Even the people empowered to 
design the state were at a loss with how to create a dichotomous political apparatus that 
integrated Islam into a western liberal constitutional model.  Modernization was not just a 
process but a wholly abstract idea and something that Afghans were not prepared.  The 
continuance of tribal customs remained the practice in the countryside while the 
constitution merely entrenched the centralizing tendencies of the state. 
C. 1964 CONSTITUTION 
The period after the Second World War109 created new socio-economic patterns 
that began taking shape in Afghanistan from the 1950’s onward and the 1964 constitution 
was primarily a response to this.  Beginning with the 1931 constitution, a new and very 
large class of middle-income people, primarily from urban areas, began to emerge from 
the various programs enacted throughout the Musahiban dynasty.110  Foreign-aid-funded 
domestic and foreign education programs dominated this entire period.  These education 
programs created the most visible outlets for the new middle-class students who no 
longer associated themselves with their tribal kin group or their religion.  Common names 
for which they have been referred include intelligentsia,111 technocrats, and urban elites. 
The foreign-aid-funded growth also allowed the expansion of government institutions, 
which provided jobs for a small portion of the new middle-class, particularly the urban 
elites.  This new class empowered by their new positions realigned the power bases and 
threatened the positions traditionally held by notables (especially those that were part of 
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the royal family) and powerful religious figures.112  Meanwhile another large, highly 
educated portion of society were left out or barred from government jobs and 
subsequently became dispossessed.  The new constitution continued the necessity for 
emphasizing Islamic religious elements as well as individual freedoms.  But in ways 
contradictory to Islam, it managed to widen the gulf between Islamic ideals, modernism, 
and western-liberal democracy.  The emergence in this period of other new groups 
included those who were greatly influenced by communist ideals.  So began the 
communist movement in Afghanistan that would interfere in the democratization process 
in Afghanistan for the next 30 years.  Incidentally, these first-generation middle-class 
students also formed the bulk of the Islamist groups who were not only actively hostile to 
the communist groups but challenged the traditional ulamā who were consistently co-
opted by the state apparatus.  Despite the intellectualization primarily of Afghan urban 
society, the traditional tribal and religious apparatus remained an integral part of the local 
community and rural level of society. 
The “New Democracy” period in which produced the 1964 Constitution was also 
a period in which the state was trying to reestablish itself.  The King at the time of the 
new Loya Jirga felt that reforms were not only necessary because of this growing gulf 
between competing interests, but also that a new constitution would help redefine the 
organization of government.  It is quite possible that this move was intended to enlarge 
the existing state structure in order to appease the growing anti-monarchy movement and 
attempt to offer government jobs to many disaffected Afghans.  An example of this in the 
constitution is the insertion of Article 24, the restriction of all members of the royal 
family from holding public office, mainly at the state level.  In any case, the competition 
between all of these new groups marked the beginning of the transformation in the 
traditional alignment of state power.  In other words, the new educated middle-class 
urban elites became the dominating force behind the power axis rather than the old tribal 
familial and religious power blocks. 
Table 2 demonstrates for the first time that representation in the codification 
process became an important factor in legitimizing the state rather than a de facto 
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institution.  As the annotation of positive and negative values in the codification process 
show, however, the process involved factional groups as well as the King’s own Royal 
group that dominated the proceedings.  Nevertheless, it shows that the desire for 
modernization continued as part of the state’s agenda but without completely alienating 
Islam.  Lastly, the results of some key propositions begin to show relational patterns 
between factors such as, the distribution of sovereignty, determination of individual 
relationships to the state, and the degree to which ethnicity is presented.  The next section 
begins with a discussion of the formation and conduct of the Loya Jirga. 

















Constitution -+ + + - + - - + + - 
Table 2. 1964 Constitutional Factors. 
 
1. Codification 
While the 455 member Loya Jirga was an exercise in political participation, a 
fully representative body did not actually materialize.  However, relative to the Jirga 
process that created the previous constitutions, the King achieved the goal of a greater 
amount of representative participation by the populace.  He appointed four women and 34 
other delegates including military generals, religious figures and a number of bankers and 
western educated intellectuals.  Statewide elections also resulted in an additional 176 
delegates.  The remaining delegates to the Loya Jirga included the government 
institutions and the two smaller constitutional commissions. 
Prior to the formation of the Loya Jirga, the King, by royal decree, formed a 
seven-member constitutional committee on 28 March 1963, primarily as a response to the 
change in the dynamics of the political atmosphere.  By all accounts, the only foreign 
advisor present at this time was a French constitutional expert, Louise Fauger.  This is 
peculiar since the writing process of the previous constitutions, while using the advice of 
different foreign advisors from France, Turkey, and Iran, took great care in following the 
example of fellow Muslim states.  Thus, the 1964 constitution took heavy stock in a 
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western, primarily French constitutional model, even though the final version still 
combined Western and Islamic concepts.  The cause of the departure of using the Islamic 
model was attributed to the dominance of the intellectuals at the Loya Jirga, who favored 
the more liberal western constitutional model, which resulted in the limited influence of 
the Ulama on the final draft process.113  Olesen described this transformation of 
legitimacy as one in which the ultimate source of authority now rested with the nation, 
was embodied in the King and practiced via the parliament.114 
The first of three carefully formulated meetings of drafting and advisory groups 
for the final ratification of the constitution produced a written draft of the new democratic 
constitution in February 1964.115  In light of the circumstances of Afghanistan’s 
constitutional history, the drafting process of the 1964 constitution was perhaps one of 
the most important experiments in Afghanistan’s desire to achieve a liberal and 
representative approach in the creation of a constitutional government.  To demonstrate 
this example, the drafting committee, in order to carry out its mission in a more 
thoughtful and representative manner, underwent a two-pronged approach.  First, a public 
outreach campaign sought the opinions of various groups within the society as well as 
organized consultation sessions held with local experts.  Secondly, the drafters referred to 
an entire range of possibilities in order to write a uniquely liberal and Islamic 
constitution.  This strategy included surveys of Islamic law, modern constitutions, and 
other pertinent documents.116  This became the first time a fully representative body of 
Afghans diligently and genuinely participated in the discussion and drafting of the new 
constitution.  Once this process was complete, the draft made its way to a 29-member 
advisory commission.  The advisory commission was essentially a barter commission, 
tasked to, “study and discuss the draft carefully and make suggestions before convening 
the Loya Jirga for its approval.”117  The diversity of the group in addition to the King’s 
inclusion of several members of the royal family initiated a heated debate as to the role 
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the royal family played in state politics.118  The findings were submitted at the conclusion 
of the three-month long debate to the Loya Jirga. 
The intention of the way in which the Loya Jirga was carried out was to ensure 
sincere representation by allowing elections to incorporate delegates from the population.  
The data regarding the process in which these elections took place was not entirely 
thorough.  Therefore, it would be false to say with any certainty that elections took place 
throughout a representative portion of the provinces.  Comparatively speaking, Zahir 
Shah’s willingness and desire to continue the thrust towards a modern and more liberal 
society, just as Amanullah’s was in 1923, was more carefully planned and laid out.  The 
entire process from draft to ratification took 19 months and was signed on 1 October 
1964. 
2. Legal Status 
There are several places that have enshrined the superiority of the constitution 
over all other laws.  First, Article 14 limits the exercise of rights and duties to the 
provisions codified in the constitution, then Article 40 makes it the duty of all citizens to 
follow the provisions within the constitution, and finally Article 64 prevents the 
parliament (Shura) from enacting legislation repugnant to Islam and the constitution.  But 
in terms of acknowledging or incorporating the customary laws that traditionally 
dominated the region, the Constitution was silent.  While the principle of supremacy is 
clearly laid out, the standards for amenability will determine the guarantee of its legal 
status.  Therefore, it is important to point out that as Article 120 codified the amenability 
it is not without critical exceptions.  Exceptions within the Constitution to which no 
amendment could be made included any reference to Islam, the constitutional monarch, 
and any part of Article 8 which referred to the King’s status as an “Afghan national, a 
Muslim, and follower of the Hanafi doctrine.”  Article 8 reinforced the infallibility of the 
monarchy by securing the King’s line of succession, thus holding the monarchy outside 
the supreme limits of the law.  In addition, it reinforced the Hanafite legal rite practiced 
by the head of state.  In other words, amendments could not be established that would 
abolish the monarchy or force the abdication of the King.  To be sure, Article 17 
specified that abdication only came at the desire of the King and even if this were to 
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happen, the constitution ensured the royal line of succession as well as the prevention of 
the amendment of any of these parts.  In any case, the standards under which any other 
part of the constitution could be amended were much more rigorous than that of the 1923 
constitution.  Article 120 allowed the process to begin via initiation by either the council 
of ministers, one third of the members of the lower house, (Wolesi Jirga) or upper house 
(Meshrango Jirga).  This process than moved to the Loya Jirga where, in Article 121, a 
majority vote was required to approve the draft amendment.  This draft amendment was 
then presented to the King who then dissolved the Shura, publicly circulated the draft, 
and proclaimed the date in which new elections were to be held.  The very initiation of 
such a procedure could threaten the term limits of government seats and therefore 
decreased the likelihood that amendments were even proposed.  Nevertheless, it was clear 
that the careful drafting of this constitution made it supreme over all laws, but not 
immutable. 
3. Distribution of Sovereignty 
Article 1 of the 1964 Constitution fully enumerated that sovereignty rested with 
the nation” and further specified in Article 41 that representation of national sovereignty 
was exercised by the Shura, via the King.  The King, in this case, was the personification 
of sovereignty and for all of the King’s intentions of incorporating liberal elements, the 
traditional absolute power of the monarchy remained.  Enshrining the concept of popular 
sovereignty in the people exacerbated other contradictions present in the constitution 
regarding such matters as royal prerogatives.  “The royal prerogatives included the 
dissolution and the summoning of the Shura, the appointment of the Prime Minister and 
the other Ministers and of the Chief Justice and the Senior Civil and Military Officials 
and the power to proclaim a State of Emergency.119  The constitutional Articles thus 
created a weave of contradictions that increasingly became difficult to resolve.  In 
particular, embodiment of the Shura was to be a representative portion of the nation that 
would exercise sovereignty on the nation’s behalf.  The power of the King to dissolve this 
body as well as transfer much of its powers to the government ministry during a state of 
emergency, trumped the ability of the Shura to carry out its duties and the will of the 
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people.120  It is perhaps due to the largely inherent mistrust of ethnic dynamics and the 
potential for the formation of political factions within the Shura that prevented the grant 
of any degree of autonomy. 
4. Relationship Between the Institutions of the State 
The 1964 constitution “signaled the end of authoritarian rule and established the 
framework for a parliamentary democracy.”121  Also in a break with the past, the 
constitution codified the formal organization and independence of the judiciary.  
Previously, the organization of the judiciary was laid out in a separate law, or 
Nizāmnāma.  Overall, great care was taken to demarcate the role and independence of the 
executive from other state institutions including the legislature, the judiciary, the 
government ministry, and the Loya Jirga. 
a. Separation of Powers 
The most recognizable aspect that set the 1964 constitution apart from its 
predecessors was the “separation of the executive, legislative, and judicial powers.”122  A 
tripartite division of power parted with the traditional centralizing tendencies of the 
monarch to retain personal power.  Parliament consisted of an upper house (Meshrango 
Jirga) and a lower house (Wolesi Jirga)123 and was granted the power to independently 
“ratify international treaties, the dispatch abroad of detachments of Afghan armed forces, 
the grant of concessions important to the national economy including monopolies, and 
the authorization to issue money and obtain loans.”124  This was a distinct departure from 
the 1923 constitution, which essentially reduced the legislative branch to the status of an 
advisory body to the King.  Nevertheless, with the power of the King firmly established 
in one of the most liberal documents in Afghanistan’s history, this power inherently 
limited the authority with which the legislative branch could carry out its business. 
Unlike the earlier constitutions, a system of higher courts including the 
Supreme Court was among the principles codified.  The establishment of the hierarchy of 
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courts was certain and no longer paid a lip service to establishing a judicial court system 
as many had characterized the constitutional period of Amanullah.  Although the King 
maintained the power of appointing judges, it was only upon the approval made by the 
chief justice.  In addition to appointing judges on the Supreme Court, the King also held 
the power to appoint other lower judges and high-ranking civil and military officials.125  
Above all, the entire judiciary was a complete and independent branch from that of the 
executive and legislative branches.126 
Finally, Article 107 granted the Supreme Court the position of “highest 
judicial authority in Afghanistan” and the ability to have complete control over all 
judicial affairs “in accordance with the provisions of the constitution and the law.” 
Another new facet to the 1964 constitution was giving the traditional Loya 
Jirga status as a constitutional body.127  If limiting the power of the King was an 
intention of the drafters, the power granted to the body of the Loya Jirga was the 
incarnation of this intention.  Although it met only on rare occasions, it received the 
power to approve constitutional amendments, a power usually reserved for the King.  Not 
only did the Loya Jirga enjoy authority in amending the constitution, but particularly 
with regard to the “State of Emergency” defined in Title Nine.  If the King dissolves the 
Shura as a result of declaring a state of emergency, the ability to restore order and 
reinstitute the Shura can only be accomplished by the Loya Jirga.  The 1964 constitution 
was the first time in Afghanistan’s history that concurrence from a Loya Jirga was 
required to extend the King’s proclaimed state of emergency beyond three months.128 
b. Lines of Accountability 
“The King is not accountable and shall be respected by all.”129  This made 
it very clear in which direction the lines of accountability went.  But the realization of the 
emancipation of the parliament from its historical advisory role was limited because the 
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King still had the power to dissolve it.130  In spite of these provisions, the concept of 
confidence voting allowed for a check on the powers of the executive when selecting 
ministers.  “The government is responsible to the Wolesi Jirga” (The Lower House was 
also called the House of the People)” and confidence voting was meant to be a check on 
the executive, or the ministry, in the event that the Wolesi Jirga disapproved of the policy 
or selection of ministers.131  Unfortunately, the aim to create a check on the ministry 
ended in the “fall of the ministry” in the case of a vote of no confidence.132  This meant 
there was no room for error or negotiations with policy, a new government would simply 
have to be reinstituted.  This absence of a mechanism for negotiation created a pocket for 
potential instability. 
5. Individuals and the State 
Chishti and Olesen posit that the 1963 constitution enshrined the individual as the 
“recipient of liberty”133 and therefore the entire collection of individual Afghan citizens 
comprised the nation as a whole.  The constitution reflected this by enshrining individual 
liberties such as the right to privacy, private property, free speech as well as other forms 
of communication, freedom of expression, free assembly including the formation of 
political parties, freedom to petition the government, free education, and finally the 
freedom to work.134  Duties of the citizens were also enshrined and they included the 
payment of tax, the performance of military service, and the duty to obey the constitution, 
the king, and to “participate in the nation’s life.”135  In spite of the careful inclusion of 
the rights of citizens, several interesting twists exist in Title Nine – State of Emergency.  
For example, in the event of a state of emergency, Article 115 codified the stripping away 
of certain individual rights.  In particular, the right to privacy – property and 
communications, the right to private ownership, the right of assembly, and the right to 
compensation due to damages incurred by the state.  Of particular importance in a 
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democratic society is the right to form political parties.  In the absence of the freedom of 
assembly, underground factions can crop up that will either hinder the proposed 
democratic process or, worse, break out in rebellion and fuel a regime change.  Article 32 
detailed the right of individuals to assemble but limiting that right to, “the values 
embodied in the constitution.”  But what were these values?  If they were as Article 2 
represents, than forming political parties were limited to predominantly Hanafi Sunni 
Muslims, a convenient course of action in the case of a highly centralized state.  “A state 
of emergency could only be declared by the King, which included serious disturbances or 
similar conditions which endanger the country.”136  But what were ‘serious disturbances 
or other ‘similar conditions’ that could endanger the country?  This meant that, short of 
an all out rebellion or war breaking out, the King had a limitless meter to gauge whether 
or not the country was in any danger.  Constitutionalism recognizes that fundamental 
rights may be restricted,137 but it is through the advice and consent of the Shura, the 
representatives of the people, that those fundamental rights are best limited.  It stands 
therefore that the codification of the rights of the citizens were more privileges than rights 
and the limitation thereof was at the pleasure of the King.   
6. Religion and the State 
Article 2 narrowly defined the role of Islam in the state.  It reiterated the 
principles laid out in the 1923 Constitution that, “Religious rites performed by the state 
shall be according to the provisions of the Hanafi Doctrine.”  While many scholars 
attempted to challenge the notion that the 1964 constitution created a secular Afghan 
state because it incorporated a purely Western model, it is an interesting fact to illuminate 
the significant portion of religious leaders that participated in the Loya Jirga.138  By 
narrowly defining the role that Islam played, many large ethnic groups such as the Hazara 
were not fully recognized nor represented in the constitution.  As Olesen pointed out the 
constitution’s “western ideological heritage,” many have failed to recognize that there 
were several attempts made by the ulama present at the Loya Jirga to engage in debates 
over the language that codified religious sentiment and the insistent push to modernize.  
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The participating clergy saw the 1964 Constitution as a marginalization of Islam and it 
was embroiling to them, but the subject did not receive the debate that many had hoped.  
This is mainly because of the increasing opposition, at the time, presented by two poles 
within the clerical hierarchy.  That is, the traditionalists who were mainly opposed to 
what amounted to a secular status placed on the judiciary, and the modernists who were 
willing to concede certain aspects of the judiciary as long as laws were not repugnant to 
Islamic traditions.  The dynamics and influential of the two traditional forces in Afghan 
politics – Islam and tribalism – were increasingly being set aside to a new dynamic group 
of educated elite and urban intelligentsia.  This group set the stage for the drive towards 
modernization thus clearing away the importance of religious and customary traditions at 
the state level.  For all of its liberal elements and provisions of freedom, the ulama were 
still able to come out on top with a narrow definition of the use of Islamic jurisprudence 
in the judicial apparatus of the state. 
7. Ethnicity and the State 
An ongoing practice in the constitution-making process throughout Afghanistan’s 
history has been the exclusion of any role that the fragmented ethnic elements could play 
in the political process of the state.  It is no surprise then that the 1964 constitution 
affectively eliminated the roots of tribal politics in Afghanistan.  There is no indication 
that tribalism in Afghanistan today is any different than it was 150 years ago.  The same 
was true in 1964.  The constitution incorporated the same centralizing elements as all 
previous constitutions had done and in all cases, the tribes remained an active opposing 
force to the state apparatus.  Title Eight defines the Administration as the organization of 
provinces.139  The constitution, however, did not explicitly state that elections of 
members for the provincial and municipal councils be conducted along ethnic lines, it is 
assumed that the free elections mandated in the constitution would produce results that 
roughly correlated with ethnic loyalties.140  Article 112, however, states that, “the 
functions of the administration shall be carried out by the civil servants and other 
administrative employees.”  The civil servants and administrative employees are the 
primary conduit between the local community and the state and it is often through ethnic 
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commonalities that the greatest communication takes place at this level.  As Barnet Rubin 
stated in his book, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, “the Musahiban dynasty 
encapsulated rather than confronted social resistance by imposing an external 
administration laid over the existing society.”141  Unfortunately, the constitution allowed 
for this because it did not explicitly correlate an administrative unit along ethnic lines and 
therefore employees themselves were not required to have ethnic ties to the community.  
The khans, once again, were disenfranchised because this interfered with the local power 
structure and social turmoil in the countryside ensued. 
8. Constitutional Reality 
The 1964 Constitution proved a great leap forward in producing institutional 
stability but by reneging on the right of individuals to assemble and thus discourage the 
full participation of society, the Constitution experienced major setbacks such as 
democratic participation.  Delaying the enactment of laws regarding political parties142 
alleviated the fear that factions would align along tribal loyalties form grand coalitions 
and threaten the power structure of the monarchy.  This ultimately marginalized the 
reality of Afghan society.  During the eight years between 1965 and 1973, the cabinet 
turned over five times.143  The result was a vacuum filled by the political underground, 
which eventually led to the 1973 Coup that overthrew the monarchy.  Overall, the 
establishment of the constitutional monarchy of 1964 did nothing for incorporating the 
tribal fragmentation since it called for continuing the Durrani legacy and their right of 
inheritance and continued the Pashtun dominance over the state apparatus.  The 1964 
Constitution did however provide a healthy framework for more basic individual 
freedoms and liberties that had never been previously experienced.144  Unfortunately, 
Afghanistan in the years following suffered an ideological crisis partly brought on by the 
fact that the “new democracy” failed to allow political parties to form and legitimately 
participate in the political process.  The following analysis of the 1977 Constitution will 
reveal how this ideology was able to take control of the state apparatus and transform 
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Afghanistan into dangerous factious groups competing for political power and eventually 
brought the Taliban to power. 
D. 1977 CONSTITUTION 
The 1977 Constitution of Afghanistan continued the dominance of the single-
party/single-ruler system.  The formation of the Afghan communist parties in the mid-
60’s helped make this a reality.  The state was heavily dependent on foreign-aid, but as 
this aid began drying up, corruption increased and the communist ideas began to be a 
very popular alternative at the Kabul University campus.  The favor given to the 
Marxists, who later became known as the PDPA (Peoples Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan), eventually led to the overthrow of the monarchy in 1973.  Incidentally, the 
very same group who put Mohammad Daoud into office in the first place led the 
subsequent overthrow of his regime in 1978. 
Much of the political transformation that took place soon after Daoud took over as 
President in 1973 is played out in the words of the 1977 constitution.  The Constitution 
represented a significant ideological departure from Afghanistan’s previous constitutions, 
in that it was an attempt to refit the government along a completely socially democratic 
axis.  One political party was designated as The National Revolution Party or Hezb-e 
Enqelab-e Meli145 thus centralization persisted.  As if Afghans could not be more 
confused with trying to come to grips with formulating a sense of nation and 
understanding the concept of constitutionalism in a purely Afghan context.  The ideas 
espoused in the social democratic movement of Daoud’s regime set the stage for 
following years of political chaos.  The military and leftist-communists were two groups 
granted power during the Daoud regime, that never previously enjoyed the power-status 
held by the ulama and tribal groups, which long dominated the statewide politics for 
centuries.146  Although the constitution never went into effect after its ratification, it is 
worth analyzing here since the Loya Jirga was used to create it.  For Afghanistan, the 
Loya Jirga has always held great significance, so much so, that any regime will seek its 
approval.  No matter how representative it is it, the legitimacy that is attached with it is 
the driving motivator of the regime. 
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Table 3 illustrates the results of the repressive policies carried out under Daoud’s 
regime as well as the reversal of many of the liberalizing policies of the regime before 
him, as revealed by the negative annotations.  Islam was given no authority or superior 
status by which the regime sought legitimation, other than being declared the religion of 
the state.  In the following analysis, the codification process will reveal that 
representation was virtually non-existence without the approval of the Revolutionary 
Party, which was essentially the PDPA in disguise. 
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Table 3. 1977 Constitutional Factors. 
 
1. Codification 
The years after the overthrow of the Monarchy between 1973 and 1977 the 
government apparatus was administered by a series of Presidential decrees put in place 
by then President Mohammad Daoud, cousin to the ousted King Zahir Shah.  One of 
these decrees appointed a twenty-member commission to review a newly drafted 
constitution.  After nine months of review, the commission forwarded the constitution to 
a formal Loya Jirga, consisting of 492 members.  The election of the members of the 
Loya Jirga took on a rather unusual quality. 
On specific days, candidates put themselves forward in each of the rural 
administrative districts and in the Urban Wards, for a total of 219 
constituencies.  The people voted for their candidates with either a show 
of hands or shouts, until the overwhelming majority of the crowd 
supported one candidate.147 
To the surprise of many critics, the opening session produced a string of debates 
amongst its members that proved it may not have simply been a “rubber-stamp” after 
all.148  The Loya Jirga membership appeared to be a representative body, since almost 
half were freely elected.  Additional representation came from the Presidential 
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appointment of 130 members representing the military, industry, women, farmers, and 
urban intellectuals.  However, the groups who had already been firmly established in the 
state apparatus since 1973, held most of the power within the Loya Jirga.  These groups 
included the High Council of the Armed Forces as well as the Central Council of the 
Party.  The Party was the representative apparatus of the Parchami wing of the 
communist PDPA.  The Loya Jirga passed the constitution and President Daoud ratified 
it on 24 February 1977. 
2. Legal Status 
The supreme legal nature of the 1977 Constitution was determined by Article 64 
to be shared with and between Islam and the “Republican Order.”  Conversely, Article 75 
placing the charter of the Party at parity with the legal status of the Constitution when 
describing the office of the President.  It is therefore difficult to single out the constitution 
as the supreme law of the land when in order “To have the ability to determine the legal 
system, the constitution must be above all other legal regulations.”149  The dominance of 
the Charter of the National Revolution Party in the constitution created a very interesting 
puzzle as to the legal status of the constitution and as the foreground for which all other 
constitutional constraints come. 
The constitution’s less than supreme status made it vulnerable to amenability.  
With the exception of the basic principles of Islam and the Republican Order, Article 121 
made amendment to the constitution as easy as a mere initiation by the government, the 
Central Council of the Party, or one third of the Meli Jirga.  It is unusual that the Central 
Council of the Party, having had no constitutional mandate, was given the ability to 
initiate amendments.  This council other than the right it was given to sit on the Loya 
Jirga, was an ominous organization for which the constitution provided a superior status 
to enact amendments. 
3. Distribution of Sovereignty 
Unlike the 1964 constitution, which manifested sovereignty in the monarch, the 
manifestation of sovereignty is unclearly represented in the 1977 Constitution.  The 1977 
Constitution established, early on, the language of national sovereignty. The first article 
codified the protection of national sovereignty as a fundamental objective of the state.  
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Article 21 further characterizes the nature of sovereignty as belonging to the people.  
What actually emerged was a two-tiered hierarchical system in which sovereignty was to 
be practiced.  First, Article 48 established the Meli Jirga as representative of the entire 
nation and the manifestation of the “people’s will.”  Then, Article 65, which established 
the Loya Jirga, trumps Article 48 by characterizing the Loya Jirga as the “Supreme 
manifestation of the power and will of its people.”  At closer look, however, the 
constitution made stipulation on the membership of the Loya Jirga.  This revealed that 
the traditional makeup based on an accurate representation of the ethnic tribes was 
superimposed with the socialist groups that Daoud brought into power, more specifically, 
the members of Central Council and the Meli Jirga, most of which consisted of various 
individuals of the Party.  It stands therefore that sovereignty was not fully distributive 
among the people so long as the Party dominated the membership of the assembly. 
4. Relationship Between the Institutions of the State 
One of the most easily visible differences of the 1977 constitution from previous 
documents is the abolishment of the monarchy.  But even more glaring in the 
Constitution, which was meant to be the modern democratic alternative to the 1964 
Constitution, which Daoud considered not democratic enough, was the deeper 
centralizing tendencies of the regime manifested within the document.  “The new 
Republican constitution stipulated presidential rule, a single-party system, and a 
unicameral parliament…therefore the judiciary and parliament lost most of the previously 
enjoyed constitutional powers.150 
a. Separation of Powers 
The executive embodied in the office of the president became the central 
focus of the exercise of power in the 1977 Constitution.  Many Articles stipulated that the 
President as well as half of the Meli Jirga be nominated by the Party and that the Loya 
Jirga which already contained many elements of the Party, elect the President thrusting 
the state apparatus into a position of subordination.151  In other words, the Party 
legitimized the ability of the President to assert his power autocratically.  As the 
government’s principal design was as an executive organ of power, it is no surprise that 
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Article 91 stipulated that the first of the government’s duties was to implement the “basic 
principles of the Party.” 
The legislature was reduced to a unicameral body called the Meli Jirga or 
National Assembly of which fifty percent were nominated by the Party and through a 
separate division by the government into electoral constituencies would be ‘freely’ 
elected by the people.152  Any legislative proposal had to meet the standard that it not be 
contrary to Islamic principles or the principles embodied in the constitution but a strange 
addition was that legislative proposals were not to go against the Republican Order,153 
once again placing an institution of the government at the mercy of the Party. 
The Loya Jirga, traditionally known as a body that could restore peace and 
stability by consensus among tribal leaders, was now given the status as a second arm of 
the legislature.  The Loya Jirga was a body, as with previous constitutions, that met only 
on certain occasions, but was granted much greater latitude with respect to power 
sharing.  The membership, dominated by the Party, ensured that any legislation, 
amendments, and cases of treason, impeachment, or resignation were at the explicit 
approval of the Party. 
The judiciary, unlike previous constitutional experiments was stripped of 
much of its power.  “The supremacy of the constitution means that acts of parliament are 
meant to be in harmony with the fundamental principles of the constitution.”154  If they 
are not, there must be the capacity for the review of such action.  Judicial review is often 
a primary duty of the Supreme Court to act as a check on the power of the legislature to 
enact laws, but the 1977 constitution stripped the court of this responsibility.  The 
amenability of the constitution, and judicial review all resided with the Party. 
b. Lines of Accountability 
“To avoid dictatorship, power should be counterbalanced with 
power…giving the leaders of each branch of government the appropriate means to 
restrain interference into their sphere of authority.”155  In addition, accountability means 
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that oversight is the responsibility of each branch of government to ensure the obligation 
of another branch of government to correct any violations or commissions of 
unconstitutional acts.  The 1977 Constitution, however, stripped the power-authority 
from the judiciary, co-opted the power of the legislature by installing a dominant Party 
presence, and even made the President accountable to the Party .  Thus, the Party was the 
guarantor of power and all branches were accountable to the Party, including the 
President.  Judicial review was non-existent, providing no check on the power of the 
legislature to make and enact laws. 
5. Individuals and the State 
As many of the individual freedoms are expressed in Daoud’s constitution, as 
they have been in the past, they are soon undermined by other contradictive policies.  For 
example, the Constitution reversed the concept of the ‘freedom to assemble’ and to form 
political parties.  Article 39 intended to permit this freedom but Article 40 trumped the 
right of assembly by establishing a one party system, led by the National Revolution 
Party or Hezb-e Enqelab-e Meli.  Daoud at the time of the writing of the 1977 
constitution was heavily influenced by and involved with the Marxist groups that formed 
Afghanistan’s version of the communist political agenda in the 50’s and 60’s, not to 
mention the fact that Afghanistan became an allocation state by receiving almost half of 
its budget in foreign aid, particularly from Russia.156  It was through the Democratic 
Government of Zahir Shah’s 1964 constitution, unfortunately, that made the emergence 
of these parties possible, hence dominating, and eventually overshadowing the traditional 
role that the ulama and the tribes played in politics.  But the 1977 Constitution went 
further than this by attempting to assimilate an Islamic and fierce ethnically tribal society 
to a socialist agenda.  Just as with the liberalizing feature of both the 1923 and 1964 
constitutions of free education and free expression, this interfered with the ethnic and 
traditional customs of the countryside, created further fragmentation radicalization of 
Islamist groups seeking to regain control of political power. 
6. Religion and the State 
Islam was relegated to a symbolic status in the 1977 Constitution.  Muhammad 
Daoud had a long-standing contentious relationship with the ulama, dating back to 1953 
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when he was Prime Minister for his cousin, King Zahir Shah.  His repressive measures 
against the religious establishment politicized the ulama and as a result initiated a split 
amongst the Ulama157 that rendered them incapable of resisting Daoud’s political 
dominance, especially after the 1973 revolution and including the writing of the 1977 
Constitution.  Daoud’s vehement opposition to the Islamists, throughout this period was 
infamous.158  Many Islamist figures throughout the Resistance during the Soviet 
Occupation including Rabbani, Abdul Haq, Hekmatyar, and Massoud, were all 
persecuted at one time or another during Daoud’s time as Prime Minister in the 1950’s 
and later as President in the 1970’s.  The role of religion in the Constitution therefore 
mollified Islam to a purely symbolic status and paved the way towards a new ideological 
expression, a socially democratic state.  While the Ulama never intended to form a 
theocratic state, after 1923, they were always involved in playing a minor role in 
legitimizing the state as well as fulfilling the fundamental basis for the judiciary.  Once 
this role of legitimizing authority was substituted for something else, however, the Ulama 
became a dysfunctional body of political influence and incapable of reorganizing against 
an increasingly repressive regime.  In subsequent years, the Ulama became increasingly 
vulnerable to many of the radical Islamic groups that formed the Soviet Resistance and 
evolved into the Taliban. 
7. Ethnicity and the State 
The Constitution was written in deference to the Party.  This meant if there were 
to be any concentration of power it would only be in the hands of the Party, resulting in 
tribal as well as religious alienation.  There were no provisions in the 1977 Constitution 
that paved the way for representative participation by tribally based ethnic groups.  The 
other unfortunate facet to the lack of tribal representation in the constitution was that 
Daoud was an ardent supporter for the creation of a separate state, called ‘Pashtunistan,’ 
based on the homogeneity of the Pashtun tribes.  It appeared as if Daoud had his hands in 
too many baskets.  He eventually made a mortal decision to alienate the Party that he 
brought to power, in favor of appointing fellow tribesmen, perhaps with the intention of 
                                                 
157 The split was among Ulama that maintained the traditional view of the role of the religious 
establishment in the political sphere and that of a newly educated class of intellectuals who became familiar 
with key Islamic thinkers of the period that focused on Islamic modernization. 
158 Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 74. 
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realigning the state to produce a more favorable situation conducive to making an 
independent Pashtunistan.  In any case, the decision to do this ended with his life. 
8. Constitutional Reality 
Unlike the 1964 constitution, which defined the King’s immediate family and 
subsequently excluded them from any involvement in politics, the 1977 constitution had 
no such provision.  Instead, the constitution gave the President the prerogative to appoint 
anyone he wished and this was the reason the constitution was never put into effect.  
Daoud, by appointing a brother, many friends, sons of friends, and even members of the 
deposed royal family159 essentially reverted to his ethnic Pashtun kin group.  The 
constitution that he created was based on a set of principles that were little known to 
Afghans at the time.160  Daoud effectively alienated non-Pashtun Afghan’s from exerting 
any sort of power on a statewide level, thrusting Afghanistan backwards by almost 100 
years to Abdur Rahman’s reign of ‘Pashtun centralization by coercion.  Upon the 
conclusion of Daoud’s regime, constitutionalism fell apart.  The provisions for social 
justice and civil rights were abrogated by the way in which power was granted to the 
Party.   
E. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
Islam and tribalism as a traditional source of authority for legitimizing the state 
apparatus steady declined throughout the constitution writing projects beginning with the 
1923 Constitution.  Table 4 is an illustration and comparison of the previous 
constitutional analyses.  It exhibits the factors that run consistent through each of 
Afghanistan’s constitution-writing processes and reveals important relationships between 
various propositions.  For example, as the two positive annotations indicate, the 1923 and 
1964 Constitutions were defined along such narrow terms as to codify the Hanafite legal 
school thereby marginalizing a large portion of the population, while the negative 
annotations indicate that the 1977 Constitution virtually excluded all references to Islam. 
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Table 4. Comparing factors. 
 
The above illustration shows that Islam played a critical role in the writing of the 
1923 and 1964 Constitutions but virtually no role in the 1977 Constitution.  Conversely, 
negative values associated with the role of ethnicity demonstrate its complete absence 
from all of the constitutions.  While some Constitutions, where Islam played a dominant 
role, allowed minimal representation in the codification process, subsequent constitutions 
allowed virtually no representation where both religious and/or ethnic elements were 
absent.  For example, even though the 1923 Constitution was highly influenced by a 
predominantly secular Turkish institutional mode, the framers still “kept religious 
legitimation in the Constitution despite the ensuing lack of clarity and inconsistency in 
the formulations.”161  Later the status of Islam was gradually deemphasized, from 
provisions of Hanafi jurisprudence, to Shari’a, to mere symbolic status of “Islam” as the 
state religion.  The continual absence of ethnic elements and the decreasing importance of 
Islam in the constitutions both had detrimental affects on constitutional legitimacy, as 
evidenced by the failure of the 1977 Constitution.  This shows that the factors of Islam 
and ethnicity share an inverse relationship with one another.  In other words, if Islam is 
narrowly defined, than ethnicity will play no role.  Conversely, as demonstrated by the 
above illustration, the absence of both tribal and religious elements had extreme 
consequences to the legitimacy of any of the Afghan Constitutions.  It is evident that 
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without the inclusion of one or the other of these elements the state is largely an 
illegitimate organization. 
Part of the analysis regarding the original drafter’s modernizing influences 
exposed a direct relationship between ethnicity, sovereignty, and individual liberties.  The 
advent of modern Afghan thought, as influence by the pan-Islamic movement, brought 
about an increased desire to incorporate the greater Islamic umma, or community of 
believers.  At the same time, the legitimating influence of the ulama still held powerful 
sway.  The greater Islamic umma however included diverse ethnic elements, which 
created a conflict of interest among the drafters.  In order to draft the constitutions that 
included what they considered the Islamic umma, widespread liberties were necessary.  
Individual liberties and full distribution of sovereignty, however, were never fully 
realized in these constitutions, as was the absence of ethnic representation.   
The problem with the willingness to unite the greater umma; lie with the 
assumption that it comprises not only the Sunni majority and Shi’ite minority but it 
additionally presumes various ethnic elements.  The separation of these two Muslim sects 
cuts across ethnic and tribal boundaries and demonstrates the importance of the balancing 
effect they play on one another.  The Hazara Shi’ite, for example, have inhabited the 
central region of Afghanistan for over a thousand years, living virtually surrounded by 
Sunni Muslims for as long, in spite of the shared experience of resisting external 
aggression, was unable to reach a conciliatory arrangement.  Racial differences and the 
denigration of the status of the Hazara by other Afghan tribal groups consistently 
widened this gap.  The 1923 and 1964 Constitutions, both demonstrate the 
marginalization of tribal and ethnic groups by narrowly defining the religion.  While the 
1923 Constitution held promise, at first, with generally including Islam as the state 
religion, it was later amended to enshrine the Sunni Muslim Hanafite School of 
jurisprudence, thus alienating a large portion of Afghan society.  This was further 
exacerbated by the provision that “Hindus and Jews wear distinctive badges and pay 
special taxes.”  The 1964 Constitution merely continued the tradition of particularizing 
the Hanafite legal tradition.  Daoud’s Constitution completely ignored the religious and 
ethnic order of society with fatal results. 
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The above illustration revealed an obvious assumption that a direct relationship 
existed between the distribution of sovereignty equally among the people and codifying 
the relationship between individuals and the state.  These two factors are also directly 
proportional to the representation of society in the codification process of the 
Constitution.  Where the 1964 Constitution had some element of representation in the 
codification process, this was only due, in part, to the balancing effect that the ulama 
played against the newly educated urban elite, in trying to maintain a traditional 
conception of the state.  The table shows both positive and negative results in this field to 
demonstrate that only partial representation existed.   
The factors of power distribution and legal status do not seem to follow a specific 
pattern.  This inconsistency is due primarily to the intent on designing the institutions in 
such a way that would keep the power centralized in the executive body.  For example, 
even though the 1964 Constitution appears to offer more promise as a liberal document, 
accountability was limited and amenability, while enshrined, was discouraged because it 
meant the complete dissolution of the Shura in the case of adopting amendments. 
Unlike Islam, factors of tribal ethnic dynamics have never been recognized 
constitutionally and this has had unique effects on all of the propositions discussed above.  
The marginalization of the ethnic participation process of the government administration 
runs consistently through all the constitutions and has always been a point of contention 
in the continual attempt of the regime to co-opt certain institutional apparatus’ based on 
the ethnic aspect.  For all of the constitutions, the institutional apparatus was affected at 
all levels particularly the ministry, but also at the sub-national level of administration.  
The ministry comprised members most closely related to the king or president, whether 
kin-based, within his own family structure, or tribal based, within his own larger tribe and 
a large patronage network was created at the sub-national in order to prevent large tribal 
coalitions and keep the tribes fragmented.  Muhammad Daoud, whose constitution 
intended to prevent this, in reality, reverted to the same practice after removing many of 
the Party members from positions in the Ministry who were initially responsible for 
getting him into office.  As Michael Griffin pointed out in his book, Reaping the 
Whirlwind: Afghanistan, al-Qa’ida, and the Holy War, an omnipresent conundrum has 
always existed in that, “whatever happens in Kabul only matters in the provinces to the 
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extent that it undermines – or not – the foundations of the local power custom.”162  This 
statement speaks to the conditional relationship that has existed between the state and 
society.  All constitutional attempts at bringing a national identity to the forefront of 
tribal consciousness within Afghanistan have failed.  Most non-Pashtun Afghan’s have 
had troubles identifying themselves with the term ‘Afghan’ because of its historical 
linkages with the creation of Abdur Rahman’s Afghan state.  The dominance of Pashtun 
tribal politics at the state level, particularly the recent memory of Daoud’s attempts to 
create a separate Pashtunistan have left bitter memories in the minds of non-Pashtuns 
throughout Afghanistan and as a result has been difficult to reconcile.  The tribal question 
again comes to mind in the analysis of the current constitution of Afghanistan.  Keeping 
in mind, the Hazara community for the first time achieved a legitimate voice in the 
proceedings of the Constitutional Loya Jirga, which has set the stage for all future 
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V. LEGACY AND IMPACT? A NEW DESIGN FOR AN OLD 
JACKET 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 27-year period between Daoud’s Constitution of 1977 and the most recently 
ratified 2004 constitution was a period that nearly crumbled all of the institutions of the 
state.  This included 10 years of Soviet military occupation, nearly 6 years of Taliban rule 
and 11 years, here and there, of utter political dysfunction by political elites hungry for 
power.  The period between 1978 and 2001 was not without more attempts at 
experimenting with constitution writing.  After the death of Daoud in April 1978, a new 
pro-Soviet sympathizer, Nur Mohammad Taraki, was put into place and proclaimed 
Afghanistan the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.  Under the control of the Soviet 
Union, Afghanistan underwent several regime changes.  Hafizullah Amin followed 
Taraki in 1979; Babrak Karmal followed Hafizullah in 1980; and Najibullah followed 
Karmal in 1986.  Najibullah’s constitutional experiment of 1987 was an attempt by a 
weak regime to regain control of a chaotic situation.  Unfortunately, by the time the 
Soviets had begun their withdrawal the political and economic situation had spun so far 
out of control that the constitution was rendered meaningless.  Revolts, mutinies, and 
underground militant party’s all formed along ethnic and religious frontiers and created 
an enormous power vacuum after the communist regime was overthrown in April 1992.  
The spirit of the 2004 Constitution has to keep in mind the 10 years of chaotic, confused, 
schizophrenic, and despotic Taliban religious rule, the 12 years of Soviet-sponsored 
dictatorship, and the several failed constitutional-experiments that remain in the memory 
of the drafters.  This Chapter is designed to analyze the 2004 Constitution using the same 
propositions used throughout this thesis.  It then moves on a comparative analysis of the 
factors across all the Constitutions studied in this thesis.  This is designed to demonstrate 
the influence that the 1964 Constitution had on the writing of the 2004 Constitution, as 
well as reveal missing elements, if any, that may affect the longevity of the Constitution. 
B. 2004 CONSTITUTION 
The implications from this constitution are expected to demonstrate how well 
Afghanistan has addressed past and present memories of state building.  Table 5 provides 
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an overview of the expected results from the propositions made throughout this thesis on 
Afghanistan’s history with constitution writing.  Associated values with positive 
annotations suggest the quality in which unique aspects of Afghan society are addressed 
and/or incorporated which will determine whether it can withstand future conflict or 
whether it will whither into another failure destined to be abolished by a future regime.  It 
will also show the link between societal and ethnic inclusion with the representation 
presented by the Loya Jirga and will show that full representation of all elements of 
society correlates with the wide distribution of sovereignty and rule of law.  The next 
section begins by analyzing the elaborate process in which the 2004 Constitution was 
finally ratified. 
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Table 5. 2004 constitutional factors. 
 
1. Codification163 
The drafting of the 2004 constitution will hold an unmistakably superior position 
in the history of Afghan politics.  Often viewed as the single legitimizing force for 
establishing authority, Loya Jirgas of the past and the present mean a great deal to the 
people of Afghanistan.  The following discussion will proceed in chronological order 
from the selection of the drafting commission to the election of the delegates to the 
Constitutional Loya Jirga and final ratification.  
As in the past, the assigned mission of the first two committees was the writing 
and producing of a working constitutional draft for the Constitutional Loya Jirga.  The 
                                                 
163 Most of the source material – articles, reports, speeches and commentaries – that can be found 
regarding Afghanistan’s 2003 Constitutional Loya Jirga is located under the “Afghanistan Reconstruction 
Project” at the Center on International Cooperation website, 
http://www.cic.nyu.edu/archive/conflict/conflict_project4.html#Legal, as well as 
http://www.cic.nyu.edu/archive/conflict/conflict_translations.html (accessed 15 April 2005). 
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first was a small nine-member committee, also known as the Drafting Commission164, 
selected by the interim President, Hamid Karzai, with advisory inputs from the United 
Nations.  The mission of this committee was to provide a working draft for a larger 
committee to review.  Unlike the previously analyzed constitutions, which drew primarily 
from models of foreign influence, the 2004 constitution was essentially a rough copy of 
the 1964 Afghan Constitution.  The submission of this rough draft went to a larger, 35-
member committee, or Constitutional Commission,165 selected by Karzai.  It was the 
mission of this committee to review the document more carefully and with the aid of an 
extensive public outreach campaign produce a document with the view to a closer portrait 
of Afghan reality.  The campaign began in June 2003 and was organized by the 
Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission of Afghanistan.  This campaign was similar 
to the public campaign for the 1964 constitution.  It included public consultations166 
working through, “focus groups, including elders, ulama (Islamic scholars), women, 
business groups, youth groups, Afghan employees of NGO’s and international 
organizations, as well as former Emergency Loya Jirga (ELJ) delegates.”167  The 
reactions to the public consultation period revealed mixed results.  Afghans polled felt 
relieved over the continuing peace process and reestablishing the rule of law, but others 
felt uneasy about minor elements such as the acknowledge of other languages beside 
Pashto and Dari.168  Despite the enormous amount of data collected, the constitutional 
consultation phase including the ELJ earned a great deal of criticism particularly aimed at 
the initial representation of the ELJ and the lack of security during the voting process for 
the CLJ.  Many critics believed the population did not adequately represent the ELJ since 
                                                 
164 Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission of Afghanistan, The Constitution-Making Process in 
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the Rome Group dominated its members,169 along with former Mujahidin members of the 
Northern Alliance, and traditional ulama. In spite of the great deal of criticism over the 
membership of the ELJ, the Constitutional Loya Jirga produced a body resulting from a 
comparatively representative electoral process.170  To be sure, “The United Nations had 
more time to make the CLJ elections more secure, hence the warlords and jihadi leaders 
had lost some of the capacity to intimidate, which they had exercised at the ELJ.”171 
The election that took place produced a body of 19,000 Afghan citizens, elected 
from all provinces, and organized into an electoral college in order to vote for 408 of the 
502 member Constitutional Loya Jirga.172  The Constitutional Loya Jirga that took place 
on 14 December 2003 was unlike any of its predecessors.  The electoral college 
subsequently voted for 344 men and 64 women as provincial representatives.  President 
Karzai then appointed 50 men and women of equal proportion.  Finally, the remaining 42 
people were chosen to represent various minority groups including 24 refugee 
representatives, 9 nomads, 6 for internally displaced people (IDP), and 3 to represent the 
Hindu and Sikh minorities.173  Criticism surrounding the membership of the CLJ and 
subsequent review process of the constitution included the formation of alliances or 
factions.    
As with past Loya Jirgas where groups aligned along tribal and religious lines, the 
2004 Loya Jirga formed traditional religious and tribal alliances.  With the inclusion of 
women and other minority ethnic groups, however, new issues began to emerge that were 
at the forefront of many of the debates.  The primary emphasis of these new groups 
focused on human rights, especially the status of women, narcotic and drug trafficking, 
and ethnicity. None of these debates was without drama, especially regarding the 
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Group. “Afghanistan Briefing,” 10. 
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women’s groups.174  In spite of the criticisms, the debates that ensued and the final draft 
that was approved was a genuine demonstration of the democratic process.  The CLJ was 
arguably the most representative body of Afghan citizens that were involved in the 
making of any Afghan constitution. 
2. Legal Status 
The ratified Constitution clearly assumed the prevalent role of Islam concerning 
constitutional legal supremacy.  Prior to the Constitutional Loya Jirga, the initial draft 
had applied a shared-supremacy between that of Islam and the Constitution, but later it 
was removed in order to, “add strength to the Islamic nature of laws in the country.”175  
Article Three abrogated the supreme legality of the constitution in favor of declaring the 
tenets of Islam supreme and that, “no law shall contravene the tenets and provisions of 
the holy religion of Islam in Afghanistan.”  In terms of Sajó’s analysis of constitutional 
legality this means that Islam is regarded as the, “starting point and ending argument of a 
legal system.”176  However, relegating the provisions of the constitution as subordinate to 
Islam does not mean that it is not binding.  To be sure, several articles enshrine the 
fundamental duty of all aspects of Afghan state and society to uphold the principles laid 
out in the constitution.  These incorporate all parts of the state apparatus including, the 
national assembly, the ministers, the president, the state administration and the Supreme 
Court.177 
The amendment process, if codified in a constitution serves the purpose of 
limiting the government’s ability to declare laws absolute including the constitution.  It is 
also meant to be a difficult process so as to prevent governments from changing laws at 
will.  The 2004 constitution serves this purpose in Article 149 and 150, which ensures 
that all parts of the government apparatus are involved in the process.  Amendment 
proposals must first be made upon approval by the President and two-thirds of the 
                                                 
174 One woman, Malali Joya, from Farah Province spoke to the council criticizing the choice of the 
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United Nations protection. Dr. G. Rauf Roashan, “Afghan Constitution an Exercise in Nation Building a 
Test in Social Organization,” 7. 
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National Assembly.  The President then issues a decree to form a commission made up of 
members of the Government (Ministers), Shura (National Assembly), and the Supreme 
Court in order to draft the proposal.  Submission of the proposal then goes to the Loya 
Jirga, convened by Presidential decree specifically for this function, and finally approved 
with the vote of two-thirds of its members.  There is no dissolution of the national 
assembly, as in the 1964 constitution.  .   
Constitutionalism, the theory of limited government, cannot be limited if it can 
create laws willy-nilly or declare laws absolute.  While this seems contradictory in nature 
this is exactly the purpose that constitutions.  While the provisions made in the 
constitution that established its superior status were no less binding than previous 
constitutions, its supreme status was subordinate to Islam but so long as its provision 
were compatible with Islam, than it was a binding document.  Additionally, the difficulty 
with which adopting amendments was made possible, showed that not only was it a 
binding document but that it was self-restricting. 
3. Distribution of Sovereignty 
Article Four established that, “national sovereignty belongs to the nation…and 
was manifested through its elected representatives.  Elected representatives are present in 
the assembly and in the Loya Jirga.  Therefore, sovereignty is manifested at two levels 
within the government apparatus, first the national assembly and second the Loya 
Jirga.178  This two-tiered hierarchal approach to national sovereignty was very similar to 
the 1977 Constitution where the Loya Jirga was characterized as representing the highest 
will of the people.  The important difference here is that the assembly codified in the 
2004 Constitution is an entirely representative electorate of the provinces in which they 
are elected.  Since there is no single-party establishment and no requirement for Party 
membership, full representation of the populace is more attainable. 
On the other hand, the Constitution specifically delineates between the will of the 
people and the will of God.  This means, again going back to Oleson’s models of state 
legitimation, that as long as the will of the people is compatible with the will of God than 
there is no contradiction to the exercise of sovereignty within its constitutional limits.  
This is compatible with the language that established the constitution’s superior status.                                                   
178 2004 Constitution, Article 81 and 110. 
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That is, as long as it is compatible with Islam, it is therefore sovereign and binding.  The 
major assumption is that the assent of a majority will respect this and not infringe upon 
the rights of individuals. 
4. Relationship Between the Institutions of the State 
The state of government institutions at the conclusion of the Taliban regime was 
in ruins.  The only institution that remained was the Jirga but this body was distorted in 
such a way that it no longer held the traditional meaning of a Jirga.179  The expression of 
this complete chaotic situation demonstrated the overwhelming responsibility bestowed 
upon the 2003 Constitutional Loya Jirga to reintroduce institutions of the state that reflect 
the current circumstances as well as distribute powers among the institutions and make 
them accountable the one another. 
a. Separation of Powers 
Complete separation of powers, as Sajó would point out, is not to be taken 
literally.  It is important to realize that institutional decision-making relies on joint input 
from the other branches of government.  The 2004 Constitution structures Afghanistan’s 
government as a strong Presidential system.180  According to Shugart and Carey, this is a 
classic definition of “pure” presidentialism in that the President is, “popularly elected, 
with fixed terms of office, has exclusive responsibility over the cabinet, and has some 
lawmaking authority.”181  Article 82 provides for a bicameral legislature made up of an 
upper house or House of Elders (Meshrango Jirga) and lower house or House of the 
People (Wolesi Jirga).  Membership of the lower house is through popular election 
proportion by population amongst the provinces and membership in the upper house, on 
the upper hand, is divided amongst the President, the Provincial Councils, and the District 
Councils.182  Article 92 gives the power of no-confidence voting to the lower house.  The 
next institutional body enshrined in the 2004 Constitution is the Loya Jirga.  Article 111 
gives the power of Constitutional amendments and impeachment of the President to the 
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Loya Jirga.  While the body is made up of all the institutions of the state, the National 
Assembly is the only body with voting rights.183  Finally, Article 116 establishes the 
Supreme Court as the highest judicial authority.  The primary power of judicial review is 
granted to the Supreme Court via Article 121.  It specifies that the Supreme Court have 
the power to “review all laws, legislative decrees, international treaties, as well as 
international covenant for their compliance with the Constitution and their interpretation 
in accordance with the law.” 
b. Lines of Accountability 
Checks on Presidential power are codified for the first time in the 2004 
constitution.  While Article 94 grants veto power to the President regarding legislation, 
the Wolesi Jirga has the right to review the matter again and approve legislation with a 
two-thirds vote.  Another check on Presidential powers granted to the Wolesi Jirga in 
Article 117, is the endorsement of the selection of Supreme Court Justices by the 
President.  The Wolesi Jirga is also granted checking powers over the executive 
department as Article 92 codifies the no-confidence voting procedure.  In the event that 
the lower house is suspicious of any member of the cabinet, only 20 percent of house has 
to propose an inquiry, but a majority has to vote for dismissal.  Article 121 confers the act 
of Judicial Review upon the Supreme Court thereby allowing for a check on the 
legislative and executive branches of government. 
Overall, the separation of powers among the various branches of 
government has been firmly established by this Constitution.  ‘Checks and balances’ have 
also been codified to prevent the concentration of power by any one organ of 
government. 
5. Individuals and the State 
The constitution appears to show a particularistic nature by recognizing every 
major tribe in Article four.  The nature of the role of women played a large part in the 
moderate language regarding Islam and the codification of human rights. The 2003 Loya 
Jirga, represented the largest group of women in Afghanistan’s constitutional history.  
This group led the way for the inclusion of the human rights declaration, with no 
resistance and no Islamic limits placed on it.  In addition to codifying many fundamental 
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human rights and freedoms, Article 137, in deference to the governments centralizing 
policies grants autonomy to local administrations to, “accelerate and improve economic, 
social as well as cultural matters, and foster peoples’ participation in developing national 
life.”  The formation of Provincial, District, and Municipal Councils facilitate part of this 
by encouraging participation at the local or village level.184 
6. Religion and the State 
The first three articles of the constitution continued the trend of enshrining Islam 
in the constitution.  During the drafting process some of the most heated debates and 
heavy criticism from the international community took place over the status that the role 
of Islam played in the Constitution.  It should not be underestimated however, the binding 
nature in which Islam has played in Afghan society.  One of the few commonalities that 
can be recognized among the majority of Afghans is the religion of Islam and this is the 
primary reason it has played such an integral role in constitutions, past and present.  In 
spite of its overall status, criticism focused on the particularity of the faith or the sect, 
more specifically the traditional role of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence following the 
Hanafite School of law.  The shifting tradition of excluding non-Sunni Muslims changed 
however with the increasing role the smaller ethnic groups had played, especially the 
Hazara.185  For example, the “near-parity” status given the Shi’ite jurisprudence in 
Article 131 was a milestone in the political role of Shi’ite groups186 including the Hazara, 
the Qizilbash, and Pamiri ethnic-tribal groups.  With a break from the past, the framers 
recognized that religion is a cost-effective affair in Afghanistan, which gave the liberty to 
practice faiths freely within the limits of the law.  The risk involved with such language 
assumed that the religious practiced respected the national Islamic religion. As Roy 
expressed in light of the external threats that Afghanistan faced in the past, i.e. Great 
Power politics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Islam was the “energizing 
power” successful enough to resist that threat.187  Therefore, it was important to enshrine 
Islam is a more broad context than the more narrow version that previous regimes had 
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used.  Although there were great fears that the radical Islamists would influence control 
over the language of Islamic jurisprudence by narrowly defining the role of Islam and 
reestablishing the Hanafite school of law and citing the Shari’a.  Their role, however, was 
greatly diminished by the distributive nature of the representative groups present at the 
Loya Jirga, especially the women and the non-Sunni Muslim groups. 
7. Ethnicity and the State 
Perhaps the first ever reference made to tribes is made in the 2004 Constitution in 
Article 6, which codifies the egalitarian treatment of, “all ethnic groups and tribes.”  
Another interesting recognition of the tribal fragmentation is mentioned in Article 16.  As 
with previous constitutions, it established Pashto and Dari as the official languages but 
unlike other constitutions, it recognized by name any other major spoken language in the 
area in which it is spoken as the third official language.  Other tribal inclusions include 
Article 20, which requires that the names of the tribes be mentioned in the National 
Anthem.  As far as the functional representation, this is provided for by creating 
institutions that are conducive to ethnic realities.  What is problematic with this 
Constitution is the lack of clarity between important legal traditions such as tribal and 
religious law.  Perhaps the representative nature present at the 2003 Loya Jirga served 
this purpose and the subsequent makeup of the National Assembly that forms future Loya 
Jirgas will fulfill this purpose as well. 
8. Constitutional Reality 
It is too soon to tell whether or not the 2004 Constitution will have a lasting 
positive impact.  Much of Afghanistan is isolated and rural and this element of society 
which has lived with the memory of repressive communist regime policies followed by a 
radical religious regime, whose intent it was to force Islam back into society on a radical 
and often brutal platform.  Much of the rural elements have not yet been given the 
opportunity to experience the liberties the Constitution has enshrined.  Many fear 
however, that liberties more common in modern western society were supplanted 
disproportionately in the Constitution and do not respect the deeply religious and 
conservative society.  Many also criticized the writing process calling it illegitimate 
because many of the former Mujahidin and Northern Alliance military commanders were 
members and thus influenced the draft language.  To be sure, James Ingalls argued that 
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the Constitution was a step backward for democracy.  “Warlords were able to participate 
not because a majority of Afghans put them there, but because Washington decided to 
use them first as suppliers of ground troops to help out the Taliban and then as governors 
to help control the population once the Taliban rulers were gone.”188  Since the 
ratification of the Constitution, however, national provincial elections were held on 18 
September 2005, without any major incidents.  Although primarily foreign forces 
provided security, it was intended to provide an environment that was conducive to 
maximum electoral participation.  The constitutional process of deliberation within the 
National Assembly so far has been without incident.  However, a number of issues are at 
the forefront of the Assembly’s ability to deliberate even in the face of conflict.  Some of 
these issues include the lack of an accurate census which has caused many to raise 
questions regarding the number of seats apportioned in the legislature, the high number of 
legislators with suspected links to former mujahidin, and the formation of political parties 
which some have criticized have a much larger connection to former mujahidin than 
previously suspected. 
C. COMPARING VALUES AND CONCLUDING RESULTS OF THE 2004 
CONSTITUTION 
The 2004 Constitution provides a positive solution to Afghanistan’s checkered 
past with constitution writing.  In the current constitution, as Table 6 illustrates, positive 
accommodations were made to Afghanistan’s fragmented society, which all previous 
Constitutions failed to accomplish.  Moreover, the present analysis revealed an important 
relationship to the codification of ethnicity with many of the propositions.  As illustrated, 
it has a direct relationship to propositions such as the full distribution of sovereignty and 
the relationship between individuals and the state.  In other words, as ethnicity was 
ignored in the past, so too was the limited distribution of sovereignty and the subjugation 
of individuals.  The opposite holds true for the 2004 Constitution in that the inclusion of 
ethnicity brought with it the full distribution of sovereignty and individual rights.  
Ethnicity also appears to have an indirect relationship to institutions of the state and the 
establishment of accountability.  For example, all of the Afghan states studied in this 
thesis were centralized including the current Afghan state.  However, increased 
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representative participation in the codification process and the positive value of the 
presence of ethnicity in the constitution directly affected the codification of 
accountability between the institutions of the state.  Even with a strong presidency, the 
power of impeachment was codified along with a check on the executive power to 
appoint ministers.  Finally, the codification of ethnicity also influences religion in the 
constitution.  This table illustrates an inverse relationship present between religion and 
ethnicity.  Where ethnicity played no role in previous constitutions, it gave the writers the 
liberty to either leave religion out altogether or define religion very narrowly.   The 
partial values placed on the status of religion in the 2004 Constitution represent the 
balancing nature that Islam and ethnicity have on the other.  For example, if the degree to 
which ethnicity is codified is high, it assumes the representation of ethnic groups that fall 
outside the mainstream Sunni Muslim population.  As the 2004 Constitution shows, Islam 
is codified as the state religion with no limitations as to the particular legal school – as 
with previous constitutions.  In addition to the observance of Islam as the state religion, 
the current constitution specifically recognizes other religious practices. 

















Constitution -- - + - - - - + + - 
1964 
Constitution -+ + + - + - - + + - 
1977 
Constitution -- - - - - - - - - - 
2004 
Constitution ++ - + + + + + + - + 
Table 6. Comparison of values of all propositions made for each constitution. 
 
D. IMPLICATIONS TO INSTITUTION BUILDING 
Understanding the dynamics of the Loya Jirga must be a critical aspect of Afghan 
state and society relations.  Its association as a tribal council has been used in the past as 
an attempt to legitimize the state and has since become enshrined in nearly all of 
Afghanistan’s Constitutions.  In the past, however, the state refused to grant the complete 
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participation of all the ethnic elements of Afghan society, thereby diluting the traditional 
significance and application of its principles to building a representative state apparatus.  
The 2004 Constitution was created by a representative Loya Jirga and enshrined the body 
of the Loya Jirga as the manifestation of Afghanistan sovereignty.  Membership of the 
Loya Jirga by the National Assembly and other institutions of government is meant to 
provide a representative portion of society.  This is achieved primarily through the 
National Assembly, which is some combination of popularly elected representatives as 
well as provincial and district council representatives from all provinces of the country. 
Therefore, it is through the Loya Jirga that representative decisions can be made to 
determine the future of the Afghan state, provided that the terms of the Constitution bind 
the society. 
1. 1964 and Implications to Constitution Writing 
Afghanistan has had seven constitutions written since 1923, of which four 
actually made it past the signing stage and became official, including the 2004 
Constitution.  The first two Constitutions were made to incorporate many modernizing 
policies but at the expense of excluding a major portion of the population.  To be sure, 
the qawm was still the primary source of local administration even up to the writing of 
the 1964 Constitution, which offered a moderate model for which Afghanistan could 
codify its traditional institutions.  The framers of the 2004 Constitution chose 1964’s 
Constitution as a model for two reasons.  First, it codified the Loyal Jirga and made its 
membership more representative.  As stated earlier, nearly all ethno-linguistic tribal 
groups in Afghanistan follow some form of tribal customary code and the embodiment of 
this legal system takes the form of a tribal council, better known by its Pashto term for 
Loya Jirga.  Legitimacy of the state, in the past, was sought through this body, and thus 
the codification of its supreme status in the constitution was meant to provide a positive 
sign to the countryside that their interests were being served.  Secondly, the 1964 
constitution incorporated a near equal status between the importance of Islam and its role 
in society and democratic elements such as human rights and liberty for all.  The 
democratic elements enshrined in the constitution were trumped by the manner in which 
checks and balances were absent and power remained with the monarchy and a small 
group of elites.  The 1964 Constitution was also an appealing model because it offered a 
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way in which Islamic traditions could be made compatible with the rule of law created by 
the Constitution.  This was demonstrated by making it difficult to amend the constitution, 
which according to Sajó is necessary to prevent the constitution “from becoming victim 
of incidental considerations at any time, if any one of its prescriptions were to obstruct a 
prevalent legislative interest.”189  The 1964 Constitution also represented the ideal 
structure in which full representation could best be achieved through a legislative 
apparatus that is primarily through a two-tiered legislative body.  Lastly, the 1964 
constitution created the framework that offered the first chance at free, universal, and 
direct elections.  Although lessons show that full representation was not always achieved, 
this was because factors of sovereignty, relationship established between individuals and 
state, and ethnicity were not fully represented.  As past Constitutions have shown and as 
evidenced by the previous analyses, these factors have played an integral role in the long-
term sustainability of previous constitutions as well as impacts on state stability.  The 
next section discusses further the impact the Constitutions have had on state building in 
Afghanistan. 
2. The State 
Designing a constitution must take into account the historical memory of state 
institutions.  How effectively those institutions administer and perform legislative duties 
are an essential task of government and will provide a partial explanation for the success 
of constitutionalism in any nation.  The 1964 Constitution offered the best solution to an 
institutional concept of design; that is, the bicameral legislature.  The privilege offered by 
popularly elected membership as well as the license to enact legislation provided the best 
option in which government could be fully representative and reflect the needs, desires, 
and historical memory of the populace.  But there are many dangers that came with 
choosing the 1964 Constitutional model for the new Afghan government.  First, the 
intention to create a representative parliamentary government in 1964 was part of a plan 
to reform the countryside and become more modern by building up the central 
infrastructure.  There was no plan to abolish the monarchy in favor of doing this, no plan 
to reduce the narrow definition of Islamic traditions – it still enshrined the Hanafite 
School of Islamic jurisprudence which disenfranchised almost of quarter of the 
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population, – and no plan to provide for some provision of accountability between 
institutions.  In other words, there were no checks and balances.  The lessons of the 1964 
Constitution, taken starkly in the language of the 2004 constitution, has created an 
administration granted more power to carry out its business at the local level, more power 
to make egalitarian decisions, and is more capable of exhibiting a full representative 
portion of Afghan society. 
3. The Society 
Afghanistan’s rural population has always been a stranger to the central 
government but there has never been a successful plan at forging a relationship between 
the state and the society in Afghanistan.  What has usually been the case is building a 
government infrastructure around local ethnic-tribal power groups and co-opting other 
important religious groups by including them into the institutional design but diminishing 
their ability to influence any state decision-making.  This practice has consistently kept 
the government out of the presence of local communities as well as continued the trend of 
centralization.  Too often, theses centralizing tendencies of the government in Kabul have 
failed to control rural Afghanistan and pitted traditional Afghan society against state 
institution building.  As a result, Afghanistan’s constitutional history has been replete 
with attempts by the state to either subdue the political power of ethnic organization or 
co-opt it.  The framers of the 2004 Constitution believed the 1964 Constitutional 
framework was considered the most egalitarian institutional model in which important 
elements that comprised Afghan society could be incorporated.  The writers also 
recognized that the 1964 Constitutions also carried with it important lessons when writing 
a constitution for a multi-ethnic tribally fragmented society. 
The concluding Chapter offers a few alternatives to institutional design in 
Afghanistan.  It will also offer suggestions that challenge policy perspectives regarding 







































Afghanistan’s current Constitution provides merely a partial solution to the 
challenges of a multi-ethnic and fiercely tribal society that have been exacerbated by 
twenty-five years of misrule.  The solution is manifested by representative participation 
of all strata of Afghanistan’s ethnically diverse society and given the power to change 
necessary institutions that reflect current and future realities.  The challenge to any nation 
involved in the process of rebuilding whether from the ground up or from existing 
structures, is there is no single answer that will provide the solution to successful 
governance and stability.  Vernon Bogdanor said “the study of constitutions cannot be 
divorced either from history or from politics, and that the reasons for constitutional 
change must be sought in the perceptions of those whom a constitution is intended to 
regulate – the political leaders of a country and the parties to which they belong.”190  If 
political participation of a representative portion of that society were present in addition 
to the full acceptance of constitutional terms by that society, than the rebuilding process 
would have a successful outcome.  So far, political participation has been realized 
through 18 September 2006 with the elections of the National Assembly, but full 
acceptance of the constitutional terms will require more time.  The answer is not present 
in a prescription of government organization, but whether that prescription created the 
conditions as stated above that have the best chance at being exercised most effectively.  
This answer, unfortunately, will not come overnight.  The rebuilding process needs to 
continue but there are ways in which the 2004 Constitution allows the dynamic 
rebuilding process to change with changing realties.  The following discusses prospects 
for Afghanistan’s current constitution and offers some institutional alternatives. 
B. PROSPECTS FOR THE 2004 CONSTITUTION 
Afghanistan’s history of state-building has been replete with attempts to create 
democratic governance, but the insistence on centralizing for a variety of reasons, has 
prevented the government from achieving long-term legitimacy from all strata of society.  
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Centralization is spoken of here as a form of government in which power rests primarily 
at the executive level of state government, whether it is manifested by a monarchy or by a 
President.  This includes the ability to allow representative and political participation 
from religious groups, ethnic-tribal groups, as well as all other groups for which 
individuals should have the freedom to construct.   Centralization, however, does not 
mean that it is the wrong answer for Afghanistan.  The structure of the institutions of 
government have determined the Presidential model espoused by Shugart and Carey.  
The separation of powers given to the separate institutions along with the amount of 
checks and balances that allow for accountability as well as the separate electoral process 
between the legislature and the executive provide a positive solution to a centralized 
government with all powers tied up with the executive.  In addition to the separation of 
power at the national level, the Constitution has delegated a “necessary transfer of 
power” to the local level of administration to accommodate the rural strata of society.191  
The Constitution also provides for the participation from a representative portion of 
society, through membership in the Loya Jirga, representation in the National Assembly,  
the right to assemble into political parties, as well as fully distributing national 
sovereignty, and for the first time acknowledging the importance of tribal elements. 
C. ALTERNATIVE MODELS AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
Other models offer long-term alternatives to Afghanistan’s current system of 
governance.  For example, one proposal offered by M. Nazif Shahrani is in favor of a 
“decentralized democracy based on community self-government.”192  This fits in loosely 
with the Federal option that was the subject of much literature prior to the selection of the 
Constitutional Loya Jirga.  Another way this could be formulated is through the idea of a 
Consociational democracy, which, according to Shapiro, is an organization of 
government that offers the most remedies to the problems of highly diverse societies.  
“Not a majority democracy, it is a form of consensual democracy, in which all major 
groups are represented in governing grand coalitions in proportion to their numbers.”193  
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The Netherlands and Lebanon offer examples in this form of governance where the major 
groups are associated along religious or ethnic divisions of power.  The Federalism 
alternative yielded the largest exposure prior to the Constitutional Loya Jirga.  The 
argument for this form of government is that it best favors the multi-ethnic makeup of 
Afghan society by reducing tensions that are normally present between geographically 
concentrated groups and allows them to decide their own fates.194 
Another option, or a loose confederation along tribal or ethnic territories, is 
through the organization of the lower sub-administrative apparatus.  This would require 
further research regarding the evolution of provincial territories in order to correlate some 
areas that are dominated by tribal communities.  For example, topographic territories may 
have correlating features with provincial boundaries of areas primarily inhabited by the 
Pashtun.  These areas roughly correlate with the belt bordering the southern plains and 
valleys of the Hindu-Kush, although pockets of non-Pashtun ethnic groups inhabit areas 
along the Iranian, Pakistani, and Afghan borders. The other large ethnic groups that fill in 
most of Afghanistan’s remaining population are scattered about the area that roughly 
correlate with the mountainous areas in most of the central north region – or central 
highlands – including a small northern plains area bordering the central Asian states.  
Two prominent examples are the Hazara and the Nuristani (refer to Figure 2).  The 
Hazara inhabit primarily the province of Bamiyan, which is roughly the center of the 
region known as the Hazarajat but also includes outlying parts of Ghowr, Oruzgan, 
Wardak, and Ghazni.  The Nuristani inhabit primarily the province of Nuristan but 
includes that mountainous region that correlates with Laghman and Konar provinces.  
Each tribe is normally incident to a low-lying valley within the region and language and 
tribal codes may differ slightly.  What this demonstrates is that if ethnic areas roughly 
correlate with geography, than administration and districting of these areas can be 
designed to reflect that. 
Afghanistan’s Constitution itself reflects a major accomplishment for a Muslim 
country to codify a constitution that incorporates western-liberal elements with Islamic 
traditions in a harmonious nature and offers a unique example to other democratizing 
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Muslim states.  One of the most important of these aspects, an obstacle of past 
constitutional projects, is the broad language of Islam that has allowed the integration of 
all Islamic sects into political society such as the Hazara Shi’i.  As some ethnic groups 
will probably align themselves by their tribal loyalties or religion, the participatory 
process codified in the Constitution should allow for a decrease in the chance of internal 
conflict, an increase in peaceful bargaining, and an increase in the overall faith of the 
representative process. 
A longer-term solution for Afghanistan, beyond the successful Bonn Process and 
manifested by the spirit of the 2004 Constitution must include the continued support of 
the United States.  Recent incidents such as administrative corruption, rising 
unemployment, and poor relations with neighboring states have made this even more 
critical.  The unexpected resignation of the Interior Minister and the rearrangement of the 
Presidential cabinet as well as the critical reports that the national assembly is a 
dysfunctional organization are raising grave doubts as to whether Afghanistan can live up 
to the terms it laid down for itself in 2003.  Of utmost importance is the fostering of long-
term, functioning state institutions, which will provide a critical cushion to the bargaining 
process.  The best way in which to achieve this is to organize training outlets at various 
levels of government so that administrators and officials may be able to seize the 
opportunity of gaining valuable expertise in the functioning of their day-to-day business.  
Another example would be to allow more autonomous decision making at the provincial 
level as well as integrate reconstruction efforts amongst provincial administrations by 
extend training opportunities where good governance is needed.  While the 2004 
Constitution is a huge step forward for Afghanistan, the institution building process is a 
continuing effort and must go on to ensure that the constitutional provisions are met. 
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